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FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW, 2018–2021
Matthew Tokson †
Fourth Amendment law is in flux. The Supreme Court recently established, in the
landmark case Carpenter v. United States, that individuals can retain Fourth Amendment rights
in information they disclose to a third party. In the internet era, this ruling has the potential to
extend privacy protections to a huge variety of sensitive digital information. But Carpenter is
also notoriously vague. Scholars and lower courts have tried to guess at what the law of Fourth
Amendment searches will be going forward—and have reached different, contradictory
conclusions.
This Article is the culmination of a years-long empirical study of the impact of a
transformative Supreme Court decision in federal and state courts. It analyzes all 857 federal
and state judgments citing Carpenter from its publication in June 2018 through March 2021.
Relying on this unique, hand-coded database, the Article illuminates both the present and
future of Fourth Amendment law.
In doing so, it identifies the factors that drive modern Fourth Amendment search
decisions—and those that fail to drive them. It examines disagreements among lower courts
about the scope and breadth of Carpenter, as some courts apply its concepts expansively while
others attempt to narrow it from below. It explores how state courts apply federal
constitutional law, blending federal and state interests in unique ways. And it analyzes the
enormous practical impact of the “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule, which
permits the government to use unconstitutionally obtained evidence to convict defendants if
such evidence was collected in reliance on prior law. Based on these findings, the Article
suggests alternative factors and paradigms that courts can adopt to more effectively address
Fourth Amendment questions going forward. In addition to its many contributions to the
Fourth Amendment literature, the Article is the most comprehensive study to date of the
jurisprudential impact of a Supreme Court case in the years following its publication.
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INTRODUCTION
For much of the twenty-first century, Fourth Amendment law was on a collision course
with modern technology. The law dictated that information shared with a third party like a
bank or telephone company was not protected by the Fourth Amendment. 1 Yet the amount
of data exposed to third parties exploded in the internet age, encompassing virtually every kind
of digital data generated by internet and cell phone users. 2 There was widespread concern
among scholars that the Fourth Amendment would offer little protection to modern forms of
personal information. 3
Then, in 2018, the Supreme Court issued an opinion that “revolutionize[d]” Fourth
Amendment law. 4 In Carpenter v. United States, the Court held that individuals can retain Fourth
Amendment rights in information they disclose to third parties. 5 Specifically, it held that
government agents had to obtain a warrant before collecting cell phone location data that
showed virtually everywhere a suspect had travelled over a seven-day period. 6 The Court also
discussed several factors that may have influenced its decision, including the revealing nature
of location data, the amount of data collected, the number of people affected, the inescapable
and automatic nature of the data disclosure, and the low cost of tracking people via their cell
phones. 7
Scholars hailed Carpenter as an enormously important, paradigm-shifting Fourth

See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
dialed phone numbers); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
does not protect bank records).
2 Forms of information routinely exposed to service providers as they are transmitted or processed include email
and text metadata, web-surfing data, app data, search terms, video and audio recordings, location data, subscriber
information, credit card information, medical and fitness data, DNA and biometric data, and smart home data,
among others. See, e.g., Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 357, 378–385 (2019).
These are broad categories of data that may obscure the enormous scale and variety of digital data that users
create. For instance, app data encompasses a massive variety of apps and data collection practices, and many
apps collect especially detailed or sensitive information about their users. See Matthew Tokson, Inescapable
Surveillance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 409, 434–36 (2021).
3 See, e.g., Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Susan Landau, & Stephanie K. Pell, It’s Too Complicated: How the Internet
Upends Katz, Smith, and Electronic Surveillance Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 22–31 (2016); Mary Graw Leary, Katz
on a Hot Tin Roof—Saving the Fourth Amendment from Commercial Conditioning by Reviving Voluntariness in Disclosures to
Third Parties, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341, 379 (2013); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 113
(2008); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a
Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 155–59 (2002); Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment
Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MISS. L.J. 51, 136 (2002).
4 Ohm, supra note 2, at 359.
5 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).
6 Id. at 2217 n.3 (noting that the government had sought location data from one cellular provider for seven days,
although it ultimately obtained data for only two days).
7 Id. at 2217–20.
1
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Amendment decision. 8 It was a “landmark,” 9 a “blockbuster” 10 a “milestone … likely to guide
the evolution of constitutional privacy in this country for a generation or more.” 11 Going
forward, scholars would “talk[] about what the Fourth Amendment means in pre-Carpenter and
post-Carpenter terms.” 12
But what is Fourth Amendment law, post-Carpenter? Scholars disagree sharply about
whether Carpenter created a new test for Fourth Amendment law, and if so, what that test
requires. 13 Others contend that it will take years before Carpenter’s impact on Fourth
Amendment law becomes clear, and that its ultimate meaning will be shaped by its application
in the lower courts. 14 Indeed, the meaning and effect of a new Supreme Court ruling often
takes several years to manifest. 15 But lower courts have now applied Carpenter in hundreds of
cases over the past several years, and we no longer have to guess at how it will shape Fourth
Amendment law.
This Article examines all 857 federal and state judgments that cited Carpenter from its
publication in June 2018 through the end of March 2021. These judgments were gathered
from a variety of publicly available and paywalled sources, and then hand-coded and analyzed

See, e.g., Matthew B. Kugler & Meredith Hurley, Protecting Energy Privacy Across the Public/Private Divide, 72 FLA. L.
REV. 452, 496 (2020); Ohm, supra note 2, at 358. See also Adam Liptak, Warrant Required for Cellphone Tracking Data,
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2018, at A1; Ren LaForme, The Supreme Court Just Struck a Major Victory for Digital Privacy,
POYNTER (June 25, 2018), https://www.poynter.org/tech-tools/2018/the-supreme-court-just-struck-a-majorvictory-for-digital-privacy.
9 Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Supreme Court Strengthens Digital Privacy, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, June 22, 2018,
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/supreme-court-strengthens-digital-privacy.
10 Lior Strahilevitz & Matthew Tokson, Ten Thoughts on Today’s Blockbuster Fourth Amendment Decision — Carpenter
v. United States, CONCURRING OPINIONS, June 22, 2018, https://perma.cc/Y94X-PTXR.
11 Ohm, supra note 2, at 359.
12 Ohm, supra note 2, at 360. See also Strahilevitz & Tokson, supra note 10 (calling Carpenter a “show-stopper [that]
upsets the apple cart of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in a fundamental way”).
13 Ohm, supra note 2, at 370 (contending that Carpenter creates a test involving each of the considerations
mentioned in the opinion and which largely supplants the reasonable expectation of privacy test); Orin S. Kerr,
Implementing Carpenter, at 16–27, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3301257 (arguing that Carpenter reformulated the
Katz test but should only apply to digital data that users involuntarily disclose to third parties); Matthew Tokson,
The Next Wave of Fourth Amendment Challenges After Carpenter, 59 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 8–12 (2020) (contending that
Carpenter was relatively continuous with prior Fourth Amendment law and that the opinion indicates that the
intimacy, amount, and cost of surveillance are the primary factors that courts will consider going forward).
14 Evan Caminker, Location Tracking and Digital Data: Can Carpenter Build A Stable Privacy Doctrine?, 2018 SUP. CT.
REV. 411, 451; Kugler & Hurley, supra note 8, at 496. See generally Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent
from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921, 925–26 (2016).
15 For example, most observers expected that United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), would have a massive
immediate impact, when in reality it had very little initial effect, although departures from the federal sentencing
guidelines did grow over time. See, e.g., William H. Sloane & Kenneth S. Levine, ‘Booker’ after a Year: New Highs
for
Sentences,
Guidelines
Followed;
Outside
Counsel,
N.Y.L.J.,
Mar
6,
2006,
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/900005448438 (noting the “surprisingly limited” impact of
Booker); U.S. Sentencing Commission Final Quarterly Data Report: Fiscal Year 2011, US SENTENCING COMM., Mar. 27,
2012, at *1, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federal-sentencingstatistics/quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC_2011_Quarter_Report_Final.pdf (reporting a gradual increase in
the number of departures from sentencing guidelines). Likewise, Ebay v. Mercexchange was initially expected to
substantially change the law of patent remedies, but lower court behavior remained largely unchanged. See, e.g.,
Stacy Streur, The eBay Effect: Tougher Standards but Courts Return to the Prior Practice of Granting Injunctions for Patent
Infringement, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 67, 67–74 (2009).
8
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in detail. 16 Taken together, they provide a comprehensive portrait of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. By analyzing these cases and the myriad of constitutional and theoretical issues
that they raise, this Article aims to reveal both the present and likely future of Fourth
Amendment law.
The Article first describes the cases in the dataset, including their jurisdictions, outcomes,
substantive and non-substantive uses of Carpenter, temporal distribution, win rates, and other
parameters. It then compares outcomes across federal and state cases, finding, unexpectedly,
that state courts were far more likely to regulate surveillance than their federal counterparts. 17
It examines in detail the political affiliations of the judges who decided the cases, ultimately
concluding that political affiliation cannot explain the disparity in federal and state outcomes.
It addresses other potential explanations, including disparities in judicial competence, varying
relationships with the Supreme Court, and differing familiarity with pre-Carpenter law.
The study examines case outcomes over time, finding that courts have resolved a greater
proportion of cases in favor of Fourth Amendment protection in recent years than they did
in the immediate aftermath of Carpenter. It reports that good faith exception cases make up a
remarkably high proportion of all Carpenter cases, albeit one that is diminishing over time. 18 It
also examines differences between circuit court jurisdictions, and identifies state courts that
have led the way in post-Carpenter doctrinal development. 19
The Article analyzes the potential factors identified in the Carpenter opinion, with the goal
of identifying which factors impact case outcomes and which do not. 20 Correlation analysis,
logistic regression, and simple descriptive statistics all point to a similar, surprising conclusion.
The revealing nature of the data, the amount of data collected, and the automatic nature of
disclosure to third parties clearly and powerfully influence case outcomes in post-Carpenter
law. 21 The number of persons affected has little or no influence on case outcomes, and indeed
has been overtly rejected by some courts. 22 The remaining factors of inescapability and cost
are influential when they appear but are rarely discussed by courts in the dataset; their
importance going forward is ambiguous. 23 The Carpenter test emerging from lower court
decisions was not predicted by any scholar, but it is quite clear from the analysis, and the
factors of revealing nature, amount, and automatic disclosure are likely to powerfully influence
Fourth Amendment decisions going forward. 24
In addition, the study addresses the possibility of lower court noncompliance with
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.1.
18 See infra Part IV.C.
19 See infra Part II.B.3.
20 It also examines which factors are most likely to correlate with each other, finding notable correlations between
revealing nature and amount, amount and cost, and inescapability and automatic disclosure, among others. See
infra Part III.A.2.
21 See infra Part III.
22 See id.
23 See id.
24 The Article also examines the cases that reached substantive outcomes without engaging with the Carpenter
factors, or engaging with only one or two such factors. See infra Part III.
16
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Carpenter. It finds that lower courts have overwhelmingly refrained from criticizing Carpenter
or refusing to apply it. 25 There remains the possibility of “indirect noncompliance,” where
courts misinterpret a controlling case in order to reach a preferred outcome. 26 The study finds
that 13.4% of determinative cases applied a narrow interpretation of Carpenter that was technically
consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion but likely in tension with its spirit. These cases may
be the result of judicial preferences for a prior, familiar status quo, and the increased decision costs
associated with the new Carpenter standard. 27 Consistent with this account, the proportion of cases
employing narrow interpretations of Carpenter has decreased over time, as familiarity with the
Carpenter standard has likely increased. 28
The implications of these findings for the future of Fourth Amendment law are varied,
interesting, and potentially of enormous importance. For a start, the Article identifies an
emerging Carpenter test, one that has developed organically over the course of hundreds of
lower court decisions. The widespread lower court adoption of Carpenter and the apparent
administrability of its standards may also bolster arguments for preserving and extending it,
even as its future has become uncertain given recent changes in Supreme Court personnel. 29
The Article assesses the likely Fourth Amendment approaches of Justices Barrett and
Kavanaugh, as well as the more experienced Justices, in light of their prior Fourth Amendment
rulings. It concludes that the Court will likely continue to expand Fourth Amendment
protections, largely under the aegis of Carpenter. Yet there is a substantial possibility that future
opinions will be fractured, with a pro-Carpenter plurality plus separate concurrences focusing
on overtly textualist or originalist arguments.
The remarkably high proportion of post-Carpenter decisions in the dataset that were
resolved on good faith exception grounds raises serious concerns about the incentives the
exception creates for law enforcement officials. 30 This Article’s findings should cause courts
to reexamine the good faith exception, a doctrine that may incentivize the police to engage in
unconstitutional searches in ways that courts have not yet fully appreciated. When the police
can rely on old statutes to obtain new, sensitive forms of digital information, they have the
incentive to aggressively collect as much data as possible before courts impose a warrant
requirement. The good faith exception ensures that any convictions they secure with this
sensitive information will be upheld. Whether intentional or not, this appears to be what has
occurred in post-Carpenter law—questionable government searches of revealing personal data,
eventually ruled unconstitutional, but upheld in numerous cases regardless under the good
See infra Part IV.B. The Article also examines additional cases beyond its primary dataset that address Fourth
Amendment issues but decline to cite Carpenter, and finds no direct noncompliance in these cases either. See infra
notes 260–261 and accompanying text.
26 See Matthew Tokson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 907 (2015).
27 These findings comport with theories positing that judges are subject to such influences, which may cause
them to resist legal change, at least at first. Id. at 903–04.
28 See infra Fig. 3.
29 Unworkability in the lower courts is an important indication that a case should be overturned despite the
interests of stare decisis. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992); Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
30 See infra Part IV.C. 36.1% of all substantive decisions in the dataset were resolved via the good-faith exception.
25
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faith exception. 31
Over 120 decisions examined in this study involve state courts applying the federal Fourth
Amendment. This dataset can inform ongoing debates about the capacities of state judges to
apply federal constitutional law. 32 An analysis of these cases indicates, counterintuitively, that
state judges may have several advantages over federal judges in applying new constitutional
doctrines. State judges have some institutional disadvantages as well, but the possibilities for
experimentation and the unique perspectives of state judges in frontier cases reinforce the
advantages of the dual track regime of constitutional adjudication that largely prevails in the
United States. 33
Based on its analyses of post-Carpenter law, the Article offers several prescriptive
suggestions for courts and legislators. It advises that courts overtly adopt a clear Carpenter test
and consistently apply that test in each case, rather than addressing only the factors most
influential to their decision. It defends lower courts’ general refusal to consider the number of
persons affected when assessing government surveillance under the Fourth Amendment. And
it advocates for greater consideration of the cost of surveillance, which can help courts address
technologies with the potential for large-scale, unregulated government monitoring. 34
By contrast, the Article advises courts to be cautious in using the automatic or inescapable
nature of data disclosure as factors in their decisions. These factors speak to the voluntariness
of a person’s data disclosure to third parties. But basing the Fourth Amendment on whether
consumers voluntarily disclose their data may sharply limit constitutional protections for
personal data in the digital age. The disclosure of data to apps, ride-sharing services, and other
modern service providers is in theory voluntary and avoidable, but in practice a beneficial and
important part of modern life. 35
Finally, legislators and regulators have a role to play in addressing the next generation of
government surveillance practices. Statutory limits on government surveillance can in some
cases be more effective and thorough than those imposed by courts. 36 While the slow pace of
statutory development likely means that courts will continue to play a primary role in regulating
government surveillance, the best path forward is likely a mixture of constitutional, statutory,
See id.
See, e.g., Patrick J. Fackrell, Closing the Courthouse Doors to First Amendment Claims Seeking Access to State Court Records:
Is Abstention Warranted?, 68 DRAKE L. REV. 445, 481–82 (2020); Justin Weinstein-Tull, The Structures of Local Courts,
106 VA. L. REV. 1031, 1037 n.16 (2020); Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1457
(2005).
33 There were also a handful of state cases that overtly incorporated Carpenter into state constitutional law, even
as that state law continued to evolve independently thereafter. E.g., Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d
1090, 1095 (Mass. 2020); Holder v. State, 595 S.W.3d 691, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). These cases provide
interesting examples of state constitutional law development in a federal system. See infra Part IV.D.
34 Low cost surveillance is particularly concerning because it opens up new forms of data to government
surveillance, is more prone to overuse, and is less subject to political scrutiny. See infra Parts I.C.7, IV.F.
35 See Matthew Tokson, Government Purchases of Sensitive Private Data, DORF ON L. (Mar. 29, 2021, 8:00 AM),
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2021/03/government-purchases-of-sensitive.html#more.
36 For example, statutory restrictions may be the optimal means of addressing government purchases of sensitive
data from private vendors, or imposing use restrictions on data lawfully collected by the government for other
purposes. See infra notes 346–349 and accompanying text.
31
32
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and administrative law that leverages the institutional advantages of each branch of
government in different regulatory settings.
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides an overview of Fourth Amendment
law. It surveys current understandings of Carpenter and discusses several ambiguities regarding
its meaning and how it should be applied in the future. Part II provides an overview of how
Carpenter has been applied in the lower courts since its publication in June 2018. It describes
the primary dataset used in the Article’s analyses and examines case outcomes across several
spatial and temporal categories. Part III studies courts’ use of the Carpenter factors, examining
their impacts on case outcomes using correlation analysis, logistic regression, and simple
descriptive statistics. It also considers cases that did not discuss any factor and scrutinizes the
importance of the digital nature of the surveilled data. Part IV discusses the future of Fourth
Amendment law in light of the Article’s findings. It addresses the emerging Carpenter test, the
Supreme Court’s changing composition, judicial inertia in the face of legal change, and the
substantial impact of the good faith exception. It also discusses state courts’ applications of
federal constitutional law and the federalist system of constitutional adjudication. It concludes
with a discussion of new directions and paradigms that courts might adopt to more effectively
address Fourth Amendment issues in the future.

I.

THE LAW OF FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES

Until recently, courts have struggled to apply the Fourth Amendment to digital-age
surveillance practices. 37 This Part gives an overview of Fourth Amendment law and describes
how Carpenter has transformed it by extending constitutional protections to some forms of
data shared with third parties. It identifies the potential factors discussed in Carpenter that may
determine whether a government action is a search in future cases. It then examines scholars’
competing theories of Carpenter and the many ambiguities that remain regarding its meaning
and the future of Fourth Amendment law.
A.

Fourth Amendment Law and Digital Data

The Fourth Amendment generally requires that the government obtain a warrant (or
qualify for a warrant exception) prior to conducting a “search.” 38 A search occurs when a
government official physically intrudes on certain types of property 39 or violates a person’s
See supra note 3.
See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914). There are several exceptions to the warrant
requirement, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (searches incident to arrest); Warden, Md.
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (exigent circumstances); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 153 (1925) (automobiles). The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
39 See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7–10 (2013); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–06 (2012). The
physical intrusion test has so far added little to the reasonable expectation of privacy test, and the Supreme Court
cases where it has been used may have come out similarly under Katz. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 12–16 (Kagan, J.,
concurring); Jones, 565 U.S. at 418–31 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
37
38
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“reasonable expectation of privacy.” 40 This latter test is often referred to as the “Katz test,”
after the case where it was first proposed. 41
The Supreme Court has adopted various theories of what makes an expectation of privacy
reasonable. In some cases the Court looks to the probability of detection by the police, while
in others it looks to policy considerations or positive law. 42 Over time, consistent patterns have
emerged in the Court’s caselaw, although the precise nature of the reasonable expectation of
privacy test remains ambiguous. 43
One particularly important area of Fourth Amendment search law involves data that
individuals disclose to other parties. Under the “third-party doctrine,” a person waived their
Fourth Amendment rights in information they voluntarily exposed to a third party. 44 For
example, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the phone numbers that a person dials,
because they have disclosed those numbers to the phone company. 45 The police can
accordingly obtain a list of anyone’s dialed numbers without a warrant or probable cause. 46
Historically, the disclosure of one’s personal information beyond a close circle of trusted
persons was relatively rare. But in the internet era, data disclosed to internet service providers
or other third parties encompasses virtually every type of digital information, including emails
and texts, videos and photos, web-surfing data, subscriber information, biometric data, search
terms, cloud-stored documents, and more. 47 As a growing proportion of sensitive personal
data is generated or stored digitally, the third-party doctrine threatens to erode Fourth
Amendment privacy. 48 Recently, however, the Supreme Court limited the third-party doctrine
in important ways and substantially transformed the law of Fourth Amendment searches. 49

40 This standard is often referred to as the Katz test, having first appeared in Justice Harlan’s concurrence in
1967’s Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967). The Court has not fully defined the concept of a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and scholars have interpreted the standard in different ways. See Matthew Tokson, The
Emerging Principles of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2020) (contending that the court
applies an intuitive model of Fourth Amendment searches that looks to the intimacy, amount, and cost of the
surveillance practice at issue); Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN L. REV. 503, 508
(2007) (positing that the Court applies multiple, conflicting models of the Fourth Amendment in different cases).
41 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring).
42 Kerr, supra note 40, at 507–22.
43 Tokson, supra note 40, at 3–5.
44 See Smith v. Maryland 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (concluding that a list of dialed phone numbers was not
protected by the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444–45 (1976) (holding that a bank
customer had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his records because they were disclosed to third-party
employees); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (ruling that testimony regarding statements to a
secret government informant was allowable under the Fourth Amendment); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427, 437–40 (1963) (holding that an electronic recording device that was not unlawfully planted by physical
invasion did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights).
45 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44.
46 Id. at 744–46.
47 See supra note 2 and accompanying text; Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L.
REV. 581, 585 (2011).
48 Such data is regularly stored in databases and made available to the government upon request or subpoena. See
Tokson, supra note 47, at 585.
49 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
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B.

A Fourth Amendment Sea Change

The Supreme Court decided United States v. Carpenter in June of 2018. 50 FBI agents
suspected Timothy Carpenter of robbing a series of electronics stores, so they requested cell
phone signal records from Carpenter’s wireless providers. 51 By examining which cell towers
picked up his signal over time, the agents could roughly determine everywhere that Carpenter
had traveled over a total of 129 days. 52 The Supreme Court ruled, in a 5−4 decision, that the
government must typically obtain a search warrant before tracking a user’s location via their
cell phone records, at least for periods of seven days or longer. 53
The Carpenter decision has been widely hailed as a “revolution” in Fourth Amendment
54
law, a “landmark privacy case,” 55 a “show-stopper [that] upsets the apple cart of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in a fundamental way,” 56 and a “major breakthrough for digital
privacy.” 57 Even its critics consider it to be a substantial break from previous conceptions of
the Fourth Amendment, reshaping both the third-party doctrine and the law of Fourth
Amendment searches more broadly. 58 For the first time, a person’s digital information was
protected by the Constitution even though that information was possessed by another party. 59
And Carpenter opens the door to protecting all kinds of digital information against pervasive
government surveillance. 60 It is, in short, “an inflection point in the history of the Fourth
Amendment.” 61
At the same time, the Carpenter opinion is notably vague about how courts should address
future digital technologies, 62 leaving numerous important issues “unresolved and uncertain.” 63
Id. at 2206.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. Carpenter’s wireless providers were MetroPCS and Sprint. Id.
52 Id. The agents were able to determine Carpenter’s location 12,898 times over a total of 129 days, an average of
101 data points per day. Id. With this information, they could place Carpenter within a sector ranging from four
to one-eighth square miles, depending on cell tower density. Id. at 2218. The Court assessed two separate requests
for cell phone records, one for 152 days and another for 7 days, which in total yielded 129 days of records. See
id. at 2212. The Court stated that its holding applied to any request for records of seven days or more. Id. at 2217
n.3.
53 See id. at 2223, 2217 n.3.
54 Ohm, supra note 2, at 358 (arguing further that “Carpenter works a series of revolutions in
Fourth Amendment law, which are likely to guide the evolution of constitutional privacy in this country for a
generation or more”).
55 Rachel Levinson-Waldman & Alexia Ramirez, Supreme Court Strengthens Digital Privacy, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(June 22, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/supreme-court-strengthensdigital-privacy. See also Kugler & Hurley, supra note 8, at 480 (referring to Carpenter as a revolutionary change and
a “sharp break from prior third-party doctrine jurisprudence”).
56 Strahilevitz & Tokson, supra note 10.
57 LaForme, supra note 8.
58 See Kerr, supra note 13.
59 Id. at 8.
60 Caminker, supra note 14, at 415.
61 Ohm, supra note 2, at 360.
62 Strahilevitz & Tokson, supra note 10; Orin S. Kerr, First Thoughts on Carpenter v. United States, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (June 22, 2018, 12:20 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/06/22/first-thoughts-on-carpenterv-united-sta/ (discussing the many important questions left open by the Carpenter opinion).
63 Daniel Solove, Carpenter v. United States, Cell Phone Location Records, and the Third Party Defense, TEACH PRIV.
50
51
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As the Court often does when faced with a broad new area of legal development, it has largely
left future issues to be resolved by the lower courts. 64
C.

The Carpenter Factors

Although Carpenter does not set out a specific test for when third-party data is protected
by the Fourth Amendment, the opinion does list several factors that were relevant to its
decision. 65 These factors can provide substantial guidance to lower courts addressing novel
Fourth Amendment surveillance questions. This section gives an overview of the principles
that may drive Fourth Amendment law going forward.
The key doctrinal language from Carpenter, according to most scholars, is this: “In light of
the deeply revealing nature of [cell phone location data], its depth, breadth, and comprehensive
reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection, the fact that such information
is gathered by a third party does not make it any less deserving of Fourth Amendment
protection.” 66 Scholars analyzing Carpenter have drawn out several potential factors from this
sentence and the lengthy opinion that precedes it. 67 The following subsections describe these
potential factors.
1.

Revealing Nature

The revealing nature of the information collected refers to its tendency to disclose
sensitive or intimate details about an individual’s life. 68 Under this factor, the more that a type
of information reveals about its subject, the more likely its collection is to be a Fourth
Amendment search. 69 The Supreme Court considered cell phone location data to be deeply
revealing because it could “provide[] an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not
only his particular movements, but through them his familial, political, professional, religious,
and sexual associations.” 70 This echoed language in previous cases expressing concern that the
government could learn sensitive details about a person’s medical, social, and sexual practices
via internet browsing histories or other forms of digital data. 71 Such sensitive or intimate details
are arguably at the very core of the concept of Fourth Amendment privacy. 72
(July 1, 2018), https://teachprivacy.com/carpenter-v-united-states-cell-phone-location-records-and-the-thirdparty-doctrine; Kugler & Hurley, supra note 8, at 496 (“Carpenter . . . raised questions about dozens of issues and
it may be years before courts give clear answers to any of them.”).
64 See infra Part IV.
65 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).
66 Id.
67 Ohm, supra note 2, at 371; Kerr, supra note 13, at 3; Tokson, supra note 40, at 13–27.
68 Ohm, supra note 2, at 371.
69 See id.
70 Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
71 Kerr, supra note 13, at 23–24.
72 Tokson, supra note 40, at 16. See generally Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2217 (noting that these types of information, as
potentially exposed by location tracking, “hold for many Americans the ‘privacies of life’” (quoting Riley v.
California, 573 U.S. 373, 401–03 (2014))).
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2.

Amount

The amount of data at issue refers to the quantity of the information sought by the
government. 73 Under this factor, the more data that the government seeks, the more likely that
a Fourth Amendment search has occurred. The Supreme Court determined that cell phone
location records generally capture a large amount of personal data, even over the relatively
short seven-day period at issue in Carpenter. 74 In other words, cell phone surveillance was both
deep and broad—it collected detailed information, frequently, for a substantial period of
time. 75 The Court emphasized that people carry cell phones with them virtually everywhere,
creating a detailed record of their locations. 76 In addition, cell phone location records are
generally stored for five years after collection, permitting the government to essentially travel
back in time to retrace a person’s whereabouts over this entire period. 77 This is concerning,
because such massive quantities of data substantially increase the potential for intrusion on an
individual’s privacy. 78
3.

Number of People Affected

This factor refers to the number of people affected by a given surveillance program or
practice. 79 Under this factor, surveillance programs that target a large number of people are
more likely to be a search than those that target fewer people. Paul Ohm has convincingly
argued that this is what the Supreme Court meant when it referred to “the comprehensive
reach” of surveillance. 80 The Court stated that, “[c]ritically, because location information is
continually logged for all of the 400 million [cellular] devices in the United States . . . this
newfound tracking capacity runs against everyone.” 81 The widespread nature of a surveillance
Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2217–18. The amount of information sought will generally be measured by the extent
and duration of a surveillance practice, or how much information about a suspect is ultimately obtained, in
practice. Tokson, supra note 40, at 18. Note, however, that the Carpenter Court assessed the duration of
surveillance in Carpenter based on the seven days of location information the government requested, rather than
the two days of information they were ultimately able to obtain. Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2217 n.3.
74 Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2212 & 2217 n.3. The Court noted that the government had obtained an average of 101
data points per day about Timothy Carpenter’s movements. Id. at 2212.
75 Id. at 2218–20; Ohm, supra note 2, at 372–73 (noting that the Supreme Court’s concepts of “depth” and
“breadth” relate to the quantity of information stored). The depth and breadth of a surveillance practice are subconcepts that relate to the total amount of data captured—the more detailed the surveillance and the more
extensive the data collection, the greater the amount of data will ultimately be captured. This study will refer to
total amount because courts virtually never separate out these closely related concepts in applying Carpenter.
76 Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2218.
77 Id. (noting that an individual subject to such surveillance “has effectively been tailed every moment of every
day for five years.”).
78 See id. at 2220 (noting the dangers to privacy of “a detailed chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled
every day, every moment, over several years. Such a chronicle implicates privacy concerns far beyond those
considered in [previous third-party doctrine cases]”); Tokson, supra note 40, at 18.
79 Ohm, supra note 2, at 373.
80 Id.
81 Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2218 (noting that the government’s ability to surveil any cell phone user was not limited
to “persons who might happen to come under investigation . . . [u]nlike with the GPS device . . . police need not
even know in advance whether they want to follow a particular individual, or when”).
73
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program increases its potential for harm and the likelihood that it will be used against innocent
persons. 82 Broad surveillance goes beyond individuals reasonably suspected of committing
crimes to encompass people for whom the government lacks any particularized suspicion. 83 It
may allow the government to monitor the behaviors of a growing proportion of the
population, for reasons unconnected to legitimate law enforcement purposes. 84
4.

Inescapability

The inescapable nature of surveillance refers to the inability of an individual to avoid the
collection of their personal data. 85 A person might escape collection of their data by not using
a certain technology, at least where that technology is not essential to modern life. 86 Under
this factor, data collection associated with unavoidable technologies is more likely to be a
Fourth Amendment search. 87 The Supreme Court distinguished cell phone location tracking
from earlier third-party doctrine scenarios partly on the ground that “cell phones and the
services they provide are such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that carrying one is
indispensable to participation in modern society.” 88 In other words, most people have little
choice but to carry cell phones with them, given the current role of cell phones in society. 89
Conversely, where an individual voluntarily chooses to use a less essential informationgathering technology, courts may be less likely to find that they retain a Fourth Amendment
right in their personal data. 90
5.

Automatic Disclosure

The automatic disclosure of data occurs when an individual’s data is transmitted to a third
party by an automated process, rather than a voluntary act of the individual. 91 Under this
factor, government collection of data that has been disclosed to a third party automatically is
more likely to be a search. 92 For instance, because the user of a cell phone transmits data to
third parties “without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up,” they
cannot be said to have voluntarily disclosed their data to a third party. 93 Further, studies
Cf. Tokson, supra note 40, at 22–24 (discussing the potential for abuse associated with broad surveillance
programs).
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Tokson, supra note 2, at 419–20.
86 Id. at 426.
87 Id. at 411.
88 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
89 Id. at 2218.
90 Tokson, supra note 2, at 424–25 (citing lower court cases examining the inescapability of the technology at
issue).
91 Tokson, supra note 2, at 420.
92 Id. at 419–20.
93 Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2220. The Court went on to note that, “[a]part from disconnecting the phone from the
82
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indicate that most cell phone users are unaware that they are transmitting detailed location
data via their cell phone signals. 94 By contrast, when the user of a technology does take
voluntary action to transmit their data to a third party, courts may be less likely to hold that
their data is protected by the Fourth Amendment. 95
6.

Cost

The cost of surveillance refers to the expense or difficulty incurred by government
officials in conducting an act of surveillance. 96 Courts assessing cost may consider the time
and effort required for police officers to surveil a suspect; the expense of operating or renting
a vehicle or device for surveillance; or the unpleasantness or risk to officers of a surveillance
procedure. 97 Under this factor, the lower the cost of a type of surveillance, the more likely it
is to be a search. In a series of cases involving location privacy, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the decreasing cost of surveillance raises substantial concerns about privacy. 98
Prior to the digital age, pervasive location tracking “for any extended period of time was
difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.” 99 But new surveillance technologies
change this calculus, making pervasive and detailed monitoring of citizens more feasible. 100
When surveillance is “remarkably easy, cheap, and efficient compared to traditional
investigative tools,” it is more prone to abuse and overuse, and less subject to administrative
or political scrutiny. 101 By contrast, high-cost surveillance is likely to be narrowly applied and
is more visible and less subject to abuse. 102

network, there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data. As a result, in no meaningful sense does
the user voluntarily ‘assume[ ] the risk’ of turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.” Id.
(quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. , 745 (1979) (alteration in original)).
94 Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 139, 175–79 (2016).
95 Smith, 442 U.S. at 745; Tokson, supra note 2, at 423–24 (citing lower court cases applying this principle).
96 Tokson, supra note 40, at 22.
97 Id. Forms of surveillance that are scalable and easily applied to large groups of citizens are of particular concern.
Id. at 23.
98 Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2216–18; United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416, 429 (2012); United States Dep’t of
Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764 (1989).
99 Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2217 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S., at 429 (Alito, J., concurring)). Accordingly, “society’s
expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could
not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.” Id.
(quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring)).
100 Id. at 2217. See also id. at 2216 (noting that cell phone location information is “effortlessly compiled.”).
101 Id. at 2218. Tokson, supra note 40, at 24. See also Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (expressing
concern that GPS tracking was so “cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques” that it would
evade “the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: limited police resources and
community hostility”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
102 Tokson, supra note 40, at 24. Note that low cost surveillance can have benefits as well, allowing the police to
prevent crimes efficiently, without necessarily increasing privacy harms to individuals. See RIC SIMMONS, SMART
SURVEILLANCE: HOW TO INTERPRET THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 18–19
(2019).
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D.

The Mystery of Carpenter

While we can identify factors that may influence Fourth Amendment decisions going forward,
what we know about surveillance law post-Carpenter is dwarfed by what we do not know. The
Supreme Court gave no concrete test to guide future decisions; it simply discussed several
principles that appeared important in the context of cell phone location tracking. 103 There is
also substantial uncertainty because the composition of the Court has changed since Carpenter,
raising the possibility that it might be substantially altered in the next major Supreme Court
Fourth Amendment case. 104 What does Carpenter mean, and what will it mean in the future?
Several scholars have conjectured about the meaning of Carpenter going forward, but they
have reached sharply different conclusions. Some have argued that Carpenter sets out a concrete
test involving five of the factors discussed above: deeply revealing nature, amount, number of
people affected, inescapability, and automatic disclosure. 105 They further argue that this test is
meant to essentially replace the Katz test in most cases. 106 Others agree that Carpenter is a major
“reformulation of the Katz test” but contend that its scope is relatively narrow. 107 They view
Carpenter as protecting only digital information that is deeply revealing and inescapably and
automatically disclosed. 108 Other scholars have argued that Carpenter is enormously important
and far-reaching, even though it is relatively continuous with Fourth Amendment law from
prior decades. 109 They posit that the three most important factors in Carpenter and other Fourth
Amendment search cases are the deeply revealing nature of the information (i.e. its
“intimacy”), the amount of data sought, and the cost of the surveillance. 110
Finally, some scholars have argued that the meaning of Carpenter may be impossible to
discern at first, as it represents the Supreme Court’s first steps onto an undertheorized new
doctrinal path. 111 They point out that, in such situations, the future direction of the law will
largely be shaped by the lower courts. 112 Indeed, important Supreme Court precedents often
require further interpretation and elaboration by lower courts. 113 In many contexts, the
Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2212–23.
See Tokson, supra note 35.
105 See Ohm, supra note 2, at 371–78.
106 Ohm, supra note 2, at 386 (contending that Carpenter’s “changes do more than apply or extend Katz. They
reinvent and supplant that venerable opinion. The REP test has been replaced by Carpenter’s multi-factor test
and the rule of technological equivalence. Time will reveal that the Katz era has ended”).
107 Kerr, supra note 13, at 8–10.
108 Id. at 20, 22. See also Kugler & Hurley, supra note 8, at 486–87 (adopting Kerr’s framework with respect to
revealing data and involuntary disclosure, but not digital data).
109 Tokson, supra note 13, at 6.
110 Tokson, supra note 40, at 15–27. These analyses of Carpenter mix descriptive and prescriptive accounts of the
case, but all are intended to be descriptive and based largely in the opinion itself.
111 Caminker, supra note 14, at 452. See also Kugler & Hurley, supra note 8, at 496 (“Carpenter . . . raised questions
about dozens of issues and it may be years before courts give clear answers to any of them.”).
112 Caminker, supra note 14, at 460. See also Re, supra note 14, at 947 (“[T]he existence of ambiguity in a higher
court precedent can itself be regarded as a meaningful message to lower courts . . . disuniformity can sometimes
be helpful in fostering ‘percolation’—that is, experimentation and reflection on what might otherwise be stale
legal rules.”).
113 Re, supra note 14, at 925–26 (2016). Supreme Court opinions frequently interpret and apply past opinions
103
104
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Supreme Court then incorporates lower court rationales into its own subsequent decisions. 114
This “precedential dialogue” allows the Supreme Court to assess the various interpretations
of its rulings and observe their practical consequences. 115 Indeed, broad Supreme Court
opinions can be viewed as a kind of delegation to lower courts, providing them with space for
interpretive flexibility. 116
Carpenter is the quintessential major Supreme Court case that calls for further development
and interpretation. 117 Carpenter’s amorphous opinion “gives judges license, if not permission,
to deviate, to innovate, and even to anticipate technological change.” 118 And the Court itself
will likely pay close attention to how the lower courts address novel Fourth Amendment
questions, as they face a “blizzard” of post-Carpenter litigation. 119 This is especially true given
the uncertainty created by the changing composition of the Court, as lower court reliance may
loom large in a stare decisis analysis. 120 The Supreme Court has noted that it may be
appropriate to overturn a prior decision if it has proved unworkable in the lower courts. 121
It is to the many hundreds of lower court cases applying Carpenter that this Article now
turns. While the meaning of Carpenter may have been uncertain or even unknowable in 2018, 122
we no longer have to wonder how it will affect Fourth Amendment law. The next sections use
empirical analysis to develop new insights about the meaning and scope of Fourth
Amendment law after Carpenter.
Over the past several years, federal and state courts alike have mapped Carpenter’s new
doctrinal paths, shaping and deepening the law. By examining their decisions, we can identify
the emerging doctrines that will govern Fourth Amendment law in the years to come.
Moreover, this analysis can yield theoretical insights about the nature of legal change in a
hierarchical judicial system, the application of federal constitutional law in the state courts, the
impact of the good faith exception on policing incentives, and more.

II. C ARPENTER IN THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS

while providing material for future courts to interpret, in an ongoing process of precedential interpretation.
Tokson, supra note 2, at 443.
114 See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234-35 (2009) (reversing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)).
115 Re, supra note 14, at 927.
116 Id. at 926.
117 Caminker, supra note 14, at 460 (stating that Carpenter’s “amorphous nature . . . now gives judges license, if not
permission, to deviate, to innovate, and even to anticipate technological change.”); Michael Gentithes, Rulifying
Reasonable Expectations: Why Judicial Tests, Not Originalism, Create a More Determinate Fourth Amendment, 59 HOUS. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2021) (discussing the transformation of broad Fourth Amendment standards into
determinative rules by lower courts).
118 Caminker, supra note 14, at 460.
119 Id. at 415–16 (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2247 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting)).
120 Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 851, 879 (2014).
121 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992); Gamble v. United States, 139
S. Ct. 1960, 1983–84 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).
122 Caminker, supra note 14, at 460.
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This Part presents the results of a detailed empirical study of all federal and state
judgments citing Carpenter from its publication in June 2018 through March 2021. It gives an
overview of the dataset and the case outcomes, and then compares outcomes in federal and
state courts. It examines the political affiliations of federal and state judges in the dataset. It
assesses how case outcomes have changed over time, and surveys the distribution of cases
across jurisdictions, identifying jurisdictions that are outliers in terms of cases resolved or
litigant win rates.
A.

Data Overview

Since Carpenter v. United States was decided on June 22, 2018, through March 31, 2021,
federal and state courts have issued 857 opinions or other judgments citing the case. 123 This
dataset was compiled from published and unpublished opinions available on Westlaw and
LEXIS, as well as non-public judgments available only on PACER or other docket services. 124
The cases were coded by the author with the assistance of a team of research assistants who
coded case names, dates, citations, jurisdictions, and other non-doctrinal case characteristics. 125
In total, there were 567 federal and 290 state opinions or other judgments in this period. This
averages out to roughly 26 cases per month and 312 cases per year. 126
The high numbers of citations per year reflect the enormous impact of Carpenter on
Fourth Amendment law. But only a subset of these cases apply Carpenter substantively, in the
course of determining whether a government action is a Fourth Amendment search. Others
merely cite Carpenter for general propositions or quote its discussions of broad Fourth
Amendment principles. 127 Of the 857 opinions or judgments in the dataset, there were 399

This count excludes Burns v. Martuscello, 890 F.3d 77, 90 (2d Cir. 2018), which cited Carpenter’s oral argument
before the Carpenter decision was issued.
124 See generally Meritt E. McAlister, Missing Decisions, 169 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (noting the presence
of numerous federal merits decisions labeled “judgments,” which, unlike decisions labeled “opinions of the
court,” are not publicly available and are generally accessible only on PACER or a derivative service thereof).
“Judgments” are often not substantive, but occasionally do go into as much detail as opinions of the court. Id.
Relevant judgments were located using Bloomberg Law’s docket access service, searching all federal and state
court dockets from June 22, 2018 to March 31, 2021 for references to Carpenter v. United States, Carpenter v. US,
Carpenter, and similar permutations. Opinions were gathered by searching Westlaw and Lexis for opinions citing
or referring to Carpenter v. United States (or other permutations of the Carpenter name) from June 22, 2018 to March
31, 2021. There were 789 opinions citing Carpenter available on Westlaw. An additional 23 opinions not found on
Westlaw were available on Lexis. An additional 45 opinions or judgments were found via a Bloomberg docket
and opinion search. To Westlaw’s credit, some judgements obtained via Lexis and Bloomberg were later added
by Westlaw to the Westlaw database. There were no state judgments in Bloomberg’s docket database that
referenced Carpenter, although there were several litigant briefs that did so.
125 Additional methodological details are discussed infra alongside the relevant results. See infra notes 128, 150–
153, 156, 188, and accompanying text.
126 There were 54 opinions citing Carpenter in the first quarter of 2021, 293 opinions in 2020, 313 opinions in
2019, and 197 opinions in the portion of 2018 that followed Carpenter’s publication. The COVID-19 pandemic
may have reduced the total number of opinions issued in 2020 and 2021, but the prevalence of citations to
Carpenter has largely remained steady.
127 See, e.g., United States v. Mills, 372 F. Supp. 3d. 517, 539 (E.D. Mich. 2019); State v. Smith, 475 P.3d 558, 569–
70 (Ariz. 2020).
123
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rulings in which a court applied Carpenter to resolve a Fourth Amendment claim. 128 This
includes 277 federal rulings 129 and 122 state rulings. 130
B.

Case Outcomes and Win Rates

Overall, of the 399 decisions that applied Carpenter substantively, 75 found a Fourth
Amendment search, 142 found no search, 144 were resolved based on the good faith exception
without directly resolving the search issue, and 38 were resolved on other grounds such as
harmless error. 131 Excluding the good faith exception 132 and other grounds cases, courts
This number includes all cases that reached a determinative, yes-or-no result, those resolved under the good
faith exception, and those involving Fourth Amendment claims resolved on other grounds, see infra notes 146,
148.
129 There were 576 total federal rulings citing Carpenter in any capacity. In one case, United States v. Yang, 958
F.3d 851, 861 (9th Cir. 2020), the majority found a lack of standing, and the Carpenter analysis was confined to
the concurring opinion by Judge Bea. This was included in the database as a Carpenter-applying decision because
the concurrence’s analysis was detailed and thorough and may have influenced the majority’s related decision to
find that the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental truck. This is especially likely because
the majority refers to Carpenter without directly citing it. See id. (discussing the “expectation of privacy on the
whole of one’s movements that is at issue in this case,” a concept that appears to come directly from Carpenter
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (“[I]ndividuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
whole of their physical movements”)). In eight other cases, the court decided two separate Fourth Amendment
issues under the Carpenter standard. United States v. Morel, 922 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2019); Cooper v. United
States, No. 3:19-cv-01007, 2021 WL 354084, at *1, *3 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 2, 2021); United States v. Armstrong,
No. 1:19-cr-031, 2020 WL 1921125, at *1, *1–2 (D.N.D. Apr. 20, 2020); United States v. Robinson, No. 7:18CR-00103-FL-1, 2020 US Dist. Lexis 59385, at *1, *13 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 5, 2020); United States v. Tolbert, No.
14-3761, 2019 WL 2006464, at *1, *3 (D.N.M. May 7, 2019); United States v. McCutchin, No. CR-17-01517001-TUC-JAS, 2019 WL 1075544, at *1, *2–3 (D. Az. Mar. 7, 2019); United States v. Loera, 333 F. Supp. 3d 172,
186–87 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); United States v. Lightfoot, No. 17-0274, 2018 WL 4376509, at *1, *6 (W.D. La. Aug.
30, 2018).
Five cases included in this number involved private actors and applied Carpenter to determine whether an
action would have violated the Fourth Amendment if performed by the government; in other words, whether an
action violated a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. In re Google Location History Litig., No. 5:18-cv05062-EJD, 2021 WL 519380, at *1, *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2021) (finding that plaintiffs alleged a violation of
their reasonable expectations of privacy in their location data); Heeger v. Facebook, Inc., Nos. 18-cv-06399-JD
& 18-cv-06793-JD, 2020 WL 7664459, at *1, *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 2020) (finding no constitutional or privacy
tort violations related to Facebook’s collection of IP addresses); In re Google Location History Litig., 428
F.Supp.3d 185, 198–99 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (dismissing the original complaint for failure to allege facts that would
constitute a violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy); Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1272–73
(9th Cir. 2019) (holding that plaintiffs had standing to sue Facebook for violating their reasonable expectations
of privacy); Demo v. Kirksey, No. 8:18-cv-00716-PX, 2018 WL 5994995, at *1, *6 (D. Md. Nov. 15, 2018)
(finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in a case involving the GPS tracking of the plaintiff’s vehicle). The
interesting phenomenon of Carpenter influencing civil privacy law is examined further in Matthew Tokson & Ari
Ezra Waldman, Social Norms in Fourth Amendment Law, 120 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming).
130 There were 296 total state rulings citing Carpenter in any capacity. In six cases, the court decided two separate
Fourth Amendment issues under the Carpenter standard. Commonwealth v. Mora, 150 N.E.3d 297. 307–09 (Mass.
2020); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 119 N.E.3d 669, 727–28 (Mass. 2019); People v. Root, No. 346164, 2020 WL
1816009, at *1, *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2020); Olivas v. State, No. 02-14-00412-CR, 2020 WL 827144, at *1,
*4 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 16, 2020); State v. Martin, 287 So. 3d 645, 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019); State v.
Sylvestre, 254 So.3d 986, 991–92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018).
130 See infra notes 146, 148.
131 See infra notes 146, 148.
132 Good faith exception cases might be counted as defendant wins on the search issue for purposes of this
128
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applying Carpenter to Fourth Amendment questions found a search in 34.6% of rulings and no
search in 65.4% of rulings. 133
We should be cautious in drawing conclusions from this relatively low win rate for
defendants, 134 as numerous variables may affect the selection of cases brought and the quality
of representation for defendants seeking to suppress evidence in Fourth Amendment cases. 135
The set of suppression motions and other Fourth Amendment litigation that we observe is
itself affected by changes in law, as defense attorneys respond to new laws by bringing or
declining to bring certain legal challenges. 136 The Priest-Klein selection hypothesis predicts
that defendants would win roughly 50% of all litigated decisions, because they will likely
“settle” especially weak or strong cases by pleading guilty. 137 However, that hypothesis
depends on premises that may not apply in the Fourth Amendment context. Defendants with
weak arguments for suppressing evidence under Carpenter may have little incentive to plead
guilty prior to filing a suppression motion. They may wish to take their chances on suppression
before deciding to plead, on the assumption that busy prosecutors will be motivated to accept
pleas even after they defeat a suppression motion. 138 The quality of representation, resources,
and time devoted to suppression motions may also favor the government in these cases. 139
Moreover, any case in which a court extends Fourth Amendment protections to third-party
analysis, because such cases implicitly assume that a surveillance practice is a search before declining to provide
a remedy in the instant case. These cases were excluded from the win rate analysis for two reasons. First, the vast
majority of the good faith cases involved searches that were virtually identical to those conducted in Carpenter,
and thus the search question was largely a foregone conclusion. Second, none of the cases coded as good faith
include any express ruling that the government action at issue was a search. The rare cases in which the court
expressly found a search and then engaged in a separate good faith analysis were coded as finding a search in the
dataset. E.g., State v. Snowden, 140 N.E.3d 1112, 1126–27 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019) (holding that real-time tracking
of cell site location information for two days was a search, and later opining that the good faith exception would
apply even if exigent circumstances were not present).
133 This difference in win rates was statistically significant at the .001 level compared to chance.
134 “Win rate” refers only to a litigant winning on the issue of whether something is a Fourth Amendment search.
Defendants or petitioners may still ultimately lose their challenge on a variety of grounds, including that the
search was constitutionally reasonable, supported by probable cause and exigency, or on other grounds, although
such outcomes were rare in the dataset. Cf. [cases with these unusual outcomes].
135 Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases
for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 237, 242–48 (1996).
136 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 24–29 (1984).
137 Id.
138 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2469–72 (2004)
(describing the incentives prosecutors face to plead out uncertain cases). Defendants with publicly funded
defense attorneys or appearing pro se may also perceive few direct (as opposed to strategic) costs of litigation.
See Kessler et al., supra note 135, at 247. Put in theoretical terms, the cost of pleading guilty might be especially
high relative to the cost of litigating a suppression motion, leading defendants to litigate more often than
expected, and driving down win rates. Id. at 245. Defendants may also be motivated to appeal denied suppression
motions, even if their appeal has little chance of succeeding. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal,
91 N.C. L. REV. 1219, 1226–27 (2013). Likewise, defendants already convicted and in prison cannot plead guilty,
and are strongly motivated to petition for post-conviction relief even with very weak claims to relief under
Carpenter. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1559, 1633–34 (2003). These cases
make up a very small portion of the relevant dataset, however, and petitioners’ claims are often resolved on
procedural rather than substantive grounds.
139 Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV.
45, 66–85 (1991).
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data represents a substantial change from the prior paradigm, under which virtually all such
data was unprotected. 140 That courts are finding searches in numerous such cases reflects the
transformative effects of Carpenter.
Nonetheless, the sub-50% win rate suggests that the Carpenter standard, while a major step
toward protecting data held by third parties, favors the government in most litigated cases. 141
However, this effect may be decreasing slightly over time. Cases finding no search were
especially common in the first year after Carpenter, and win rates have increased somewhat
since then. 142 For instance, in 2020, courts applying Carpenter to Fourth Amendment questions
found a search in 36.6% of yes-or-no rulings, a higher rate than in previous years. 143 As courts
and litigants gain familiarity with the Carpenter standard, win rates may increase further. 144
1.

Federal and State Decisions and Judicial Partisanship

Interestingly, win rates differed significantly between federal and state cases. 145 In the set
of 277 substantive federal decisions, 32 found a Fourth Amendment search, 114 found no
search, 117 were resolved based on the good faith exception, and 14 were resolved on other
grounds. 146 Excluding good faith and other grounds cases, federal courts applying Carpenter to
See, e.g., In re Application of the United States for Hist. Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 611–12 (5th Cir. 2013)
(finding cell phone location data to be a business record that the government can access without a warrant);
United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding no Fourth Amendment protection for email
or IP addresses), but see Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84–85 (2001) (declining to allow the
government to obtain data disclosed to state hospital employees, albeit in a case where the third-party doctrine
issue was not expressly before the Court).
141 In the absence of meaningful selection effects in the criminal context, or even given such effects, a low rate
of winning litigated Fourth Amendment issues may indicate that the governing legal standard favors one side
over the other. Kessler et al., supra note 135, at 244–45.
142 See infra Fig.1.
143 In 2020 there were 71 determinative rulings, of which 26 found a Fourth Amendment search. In 2019 there
were 90 determinative rulings, of which 25 found a Fourth Amendment search, a rate of 27.8%. Many of the
rulings finding no search in 2019 were concentrated in the first two quarters of that year. See infra Fig. 1. In the
portion of 2018 that followed Carpenter’s publication, there were 45 determinative rulings, 16 of which found a
Fourth Amendment search, a rate of 35.6%. This 2018 number may also somewhat overstate courts’ tendency
to apply Carpenter to find searches in new cases. Several of the 16 cases from 2018 involved initial
acknowledgements by courts that the tracking of historical cell site location information required a warrant under
Carpenter. See, e.g., Ferrari v. State, 260 So. 3d 295, 305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018).
144 There is some evidence in the dataset suggesting that win rates will continue to rise. In the first quarter of
2021, there were 11 determinative rulings, of which 5 found a Fourth Amendment search, a rate of 45.5%.
145 The difference in win rates between federal and state courts was statistically significant at the .001 level.
146 Of the cases decided on other grounds, three found that an attorney was not ineffective for failing to challenge
the admission of cell site location information: Pollard-El, Jr. v. Payne, No. 4:18-CV-590 SRW, 2021 WL 735731,
at *11 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 25, 2021); Sharpe v. Shinn, No. CV-19-04847-PHX-DWL, 2020 BL 232229 *1, *7 (D.
Ariz. June 22, 2020); Vega v. United States, No. CV-17-9022-R, 2018 WL 10128077 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2018);
one made a similar ruling but added that any error was harmless, Michel v. Kirkpatrick, No. 18-CV-2469, 2020
WL 5802314, at *1, *11 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2020); one held that the law was not clearly established for the
purposes of a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Mackey v. Hanson, No. 19-cv-01062, 2019 WL 5894306,
at *1, *6 (D. Colo. Nov. 12, 2019); four ruled that Carpenter was not retroactive and thus could not provide a basis
for vacating a conviction, In re Symonette, No. 19-12232-F, 2019 BL 253500, at *1, *2 (11th Cir. July 9, 2019); In
re Baker, 2019 WL 3822305 (11th Cir. Jan. 9, 2019); United States v. Stamat, No. 13-306(7), 2021 WL 252424, at
140
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Fourth Amendment questions found a search in only 21.9% of rulings. 147
State court applications of Carpenter tell a different story. Of the 122 state rulings that
applied Carpenter substantively, 43 found a Fourth Amendment search, 28 found no search, 27
were resolved based on the good faith exception, and 24 were resolved on other grounds. 148
Excluding good faith and other grounds cases, state courts applying Carpenter to Fourth
Amendment questions found a search in 60.6% of rulings. 149 This is a far higher win rate than
was observed in federal cases.
There are several possible explanations for the higher win rates observed in state courts.
The political alignment of state judges may differ on average from that of federal judges. If
federal judges are more conservative or pro-law-enforcement than state judges, that may be
reflected in the difference in federal and state win rates. Yet there is little in the data to support
this explanation. A plurality of the federal judges in the relevant dataset were appointed by
Democratic-party presidents, 150 while a majority of the state judges were appointed by
Republican-party officials or elected on a Republican party ticket. 151 Contrary to the political
alignment theory, Republican-aligned judges (or panels) were slightly more likely to rule in favor
of finding a Fourth Amendment search than Democratic-aligned judges. 152 Ultimately, there
was no statistically significant correlation between the party alignment of a judge (or panel)
and the outcome of the Carpenter question. 153 This suggests both that Carpenter issues are not
*1, *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 26, 2021); United States v. Sandoval, 435 F. Supp. 3d 393, 397 (D.R.I. 2020); United States
v. Davis, No. 1:13-cr-28, 2019 WL 1584634, at *1, *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2019); and one ruled that Carpenter was
not retroactive and also held that the petitioner’s attorney had not given ineffective assistance, Cutts v. Miller,
2021 WL 242891, at *1, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2021). Additionally, two opinions remanded their cases for more
fact finding after a detailed analysis of Carpenter and its meaning, In re Search of Information Stored at Premises
Controlled by Google, 481 F. Supp. 3d 730, 755–56 (N.D. Ill. 2020); United States v. Hasbajrami, 945 F.3d 641,
671–73 (2d Cir. 2019); and one found harmless error and declined to rule while implicitly endorsing the
petitioner’s claims of a Fourth Amendment violation, United States v. Moalin, 973 F.3d 977, 992–93 (9th Cir.
2020).
147 Federal courts found a search in 33 out of 146 determinative, yes-or-no decisions.
148 These cases reach outcomes similar to those of the federal cases decided on other grounds, see supra note 146,
although two outcomes predominate in the state cases. These predominant outcomes were findings of no
ineffective assistance of counsel, e.g., State v. Ruiz, No. 1-17-1439, 2020 WL 3271370, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. June
17, 2020), and findings of harmless error, e.g., Dixon v. State, 595 S.W.3d 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).
149 State courts found a search in 43 out of 71 determinative, yes-or-no decisions.
150 There were 146 federal determinative rulings on whether a government action was a Fourth Amendment
search. Of these, 67 (45.9%) were decided by a judge appointed by a Democratic-party president (or by a panel
of judges with a majority appointed by Democratic-party presidents), 49 (33.6%) were decided by Republicanappointed judges (or Republican-appointed majority panels), and 30 (20.5%) were decided by magistrate judges.
151 Of the 71 state judgments where judges issued a determinative ruling on whether a government action was a
Fourth Amendment search, 17 (23.9%) were decided by a Democratic-aligned judge (or by a panel of judges with
a majority of Democratic-aligned judges), 41 (57.7%) were decided by a Republican-aligned judges (or
Republican-aligned majority panels), 10 (14.1%) were unaligned, and 3 (4.2%) involved balanced two-judge
panels.
152 Twenty-five of 84 (29.8%) cases decided by Democratic-aligned judges or panels found a search, compared
to 37 of 90 (41.1%) cases decided by Republican-aligned judges or panels. For the purposes of this analysis,
panels of multiple judges were treated as a Democratic-aligned panel if they were majority Democratic-aligned,
and as a Republican-aligned panel if they were majority Republican-aligned.
153 There were 174 total determinative cases involving a judge or panel with a discernable political alignment. The
correlation coefficient for Democratic alignment and case outcome was -.118, which was not statistically
significant at any level.
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especially partisan and that the win rate disparities between federal and state courts cannot be
explained by reference to partisanship.
Another potential explanation is that the cases brought in state courts in the wake of
Carpenter might differ in some material way from those brought in federal courts. This variation
is not apparent from an examination of the facts in substantive state and federal post-Carpenter
cases, but the merits or the contexts of the cases might vary in ways that are difficult to detect.
It is also possible that state judges are applying Carpenter more (or less) faithfully than federal
judges. State judges might feel less confident about “narrowing from below” or otherwise
diverging from Carpenter relative to federal judges. 154 Alternatively, state judges may be less
capable than their federal counterparts, and may be misinterpreting Carpenter in some
substantial way. 155
Finally, state judges likely had less experience than federal judges with applying the robust
third-party doctrine that prevailed in the lower courts prior to Carpenter, and so may be less
biased in favor of the pre-change status quo. Prior studies indicate that judges can be resistant
to doctrinal changes, in part due to habituation and status quo bias. 156 It is plausible that federal
judges might be more inclined to apply Carpenter narrowly and to preserve the familiar thirdparty doctrine. There is substantial evidence for this theory in the data. In federal cases
reaching a determinative decision regarding a Fourth Amendment search, 24 of 146 (16.4%)
endorsed a strong version of the third-party doctrine, one that would likely limit the reach of
Carpenter to its specific facts. 157 For example, in United States v. Barnes, the district court stated
that “[i]t is well-settled that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information
he voluntarily turns over to third parties” and characterized Carpenter as leaving the third-party
doctrine in place. 158 In the set of determinative state cases, only 5 of 71 (7.0%) cases endorsed
an especially strong third-party doctrine. On average, state judges may be more open than
federal judges to the idea that Carpenter transformed and substantially limited the third-party
doctrine. 159

Re, supra note 14, at 923.
See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1120-21 (1977).
156 Tokson, supra note 26, at 912.
157 Cases were coded as employing a strong version of the third-party doctrine if they described that doctrine
without addressing Carpenter’s potential limitations of it, or if they otherwise applied an exceptionally narrow
version of Carpenter while citing it cursorily. See infra note 158. Cases adopting a narrow but plausible interpretation
of Carpenter after a discussion of its reasoning were not considered to have applied an unusually strong version
of the third-party doctrine. See, e.g., State v. Adame, 476 P.3d 872, 880 (N.M. 2020).
158 United States v. Barnes, No. CR18-5141 BHS, 2019 WL 2515317, at *1, *4 (W.D. Wash. June 18, 2019)
(internal quotation marks omitted). See also, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 841 Fed. App’x 346, 350 (3d Cir. 2020)
(“The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed
by him to Government authorities.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Standing Akimbo, LLC v. United States
through Internal Revenue Serv., 955 F.3d 1146, 1164–65 (10th Cir. 2020) (stating that “a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
159 See discussion infra Part IV.D.1.
154
155
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2.

Case Outcomes Over Time

Figure 1 depicts the substantive outcomes of cases applying Carpenter in the dataset over
time. It includes the three main outcomes: cases finding a search, cases finding no search, and
cases resolved on the basis of the good faith exception. 160 As mentioned above, many of the
cases finding no Fourth Amendment search were decided in the first year after Carpenter. Cases
finding no search have become less common over time, while cases finding a search have held
relatively steady.

Figure 1
Substantive Outcomes of Cases Applying Carpenter, by Quarter

Case Outcomes
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Yes Search
No Search
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As expected, cases applying the good faith exception were numerous immediately after
Carpenter. In this period, courts resolved many cases involving the warrantless collection of cell

It omits cases decided on other miscellaneous grounds. See supra note 131 and accompanying text; supra notes
146, 148.
160

21

2021 Q1

phone location data under pre-Carpenter law. 161 The incidence of good faith exception rulings
has diminished somewhat over time, as these cases become less common. The implications of
the large, albeit decreasing, number of good faith cases in the dataset are discussed further in
Part IV.C.
3.

Case Outcomes by Jurisdiction

This section examines the distribution of cases across various jurisdictions. It begins with
the federal courts of appeals. Most of the 66 circuit court cases involved appeals from preCarpenter decisions or decisions that did not mention Carpenter, and only 7 involved appeals
from another case in the dataset. 162 Of these, 2 cases reversed a lower court decision, and 1 of
these was itself vacated pending en banc review. 163
Table 1 reports the outcomes of all federal circuit court opinions applying Carpenter, and
the number and win rate of cases that reached a determinative, yes-or-no ruling on whether a
government action was a Fourth Amendment search. The First Circuit was notable for issuing
a relatively high number of determinative rulings, none of which found a Fourth Amendment
search. Overall, only 10.7% of circuit court cases reaching a determinative decision found a
search.

161 See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 336 F. Supp. 3d 817 (E.D. Mich. 2018); United States v. Walton, 403
F.Supp.3d 839 (C.D. Cal. 2018).
162 Five of these seven cases affirmed the lower court decision. United States v. Thompson, 976 F.3d 815, 824
(8th Cir. 2020); United States v. Reed, 978 F.3d 538, 545 (8th Cir. 2020); Stamps v. Capalupo, 780 F. App’x 45,
46 (4th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 276 (2020); Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 979 F.3d
219, 234 (4th Cir. 2020), rev’d en banc and remanded, 2 F.4th 330 (4th Cir. 2021); Davis v. United States, No. 2011149-E, 2021 BL 26088, at *1, *11 (11th Cir. Jan. 26, 2021). The other two are discussed infra note 163.
163 United States v. Beverly, 943 F.3d 225, 239 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2550 (2020); United States v.
Moore-Bush, 381 F. Supp. 3d 139, 150 (D. Mass. 2019), rev’d and remanded, 963 F.3d 29, 47 (1st Cir. 2020), reh’g en
banc granted, vacated, 982 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2020).
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Table 1
Circuit Court Decisions and Defendant Win Rates, by Circuit
Circuit

Total
Substantive
Decisions

Determinative
Rulings

Win Rates

Good Faith
Exception
Rulings 164

1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
DC

5
7
7
6
4
9
4
3
10
2
9
1

5
0
3
2
3
3
1
1
4
2
3
1

.000
–
.000
.000
.000
.000
1.000
.000
.500
.000
.000
.000

0
6
4
4
1
6
3
2
5
0
4
0

Total

67

28

.107

35

Table 2 reports the outcomes of all federal district court opinions applying Carpenter, and
the number and win rate of cases that reach a determinative, yes-or-no ruling on whether a
government action was a Fourth Amendment search. District courts in the Eleventh Circuit,
and specifically in the Northern District of Georgia, were notable for hearing a
disproportionate number of cases involving Carpenter and disposing of most of those cases
based on the good faith exception. This might reflect especially aggressive use of cell-site
location tracking in the Atlanta area by law enforcement officials prior to the Carpenter ruling,
as these cases typically involved such tracking. 165 District courts in the Eighth Circuit stood
out for issuing a relatively large number of determinative rulings and finding a Fourth
Amendment search in more than half of such rulings.

These refer to rulings where no determinative ruling was reached and the case was resolved on good faith
exception grounds. There were three total rulings that were neither substantive nor good faith exception rulings,
which were resolved on other procedural grounds. See supra note 146.
165 Cf. Brendan Keefe, The Investigators: Police Could Be Secretly Tracking Your Phone, 11 ALIVE, (Nov. 5, 2014, 10:02
AM), https://www.11alive.com/article/news/local/investigations/the-investigators-police-could-be-secretlytracking-your-phone/253276136 (reporting on an Atlanta-area police department’s aggressive use of stingray cell
phone tracking devices prior to 2018).
164
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Table 2
District Court Decisions and Defendant Win Rates, by Circuit of District Court
Circuit
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
DC
FISC 167
Total

Total
Substantive
Decisions

Determinative
Rulings

Win Rates

Good Faith
Exception
Rulings 166

13
26
8
18
7
17
21
26
31
8
33
1
1

10
13
2
11
3
5
14
17
22
6
13
1
1

.200
.308
.000
.364
.250
.000
.286
.529
.136
.167
.000
1.000
.000

2
11
5
7
3
12
6
7
7
1
21
0
0

210

118

.246

82

Overall, 24.6% of district court cases reaching a determinative decision found a search.
This is a low win rate, but it is notably higher than the 10.7% rate observed in circuit court
cases. 168 One potential explanation for this is that, prior to Carpenter, circuit courts ruled
uniformly that cell phone location tracking was not a Fourth Amendment search, 169 while
district courts had been split on the issue. 170 The circuit courts might be relatively hostile
toward Carpenter and especially likely to interpret it narrowly. Another explanation might be
that criminal defendants and habeas petitioners are incentivized to appeal even frivolous
166 These refer to rulings where no determinative ruling was reached and the case was resolved on good faith
exception grounds. There were ten total rulings that were neither substantive nor good faith exception rulings,
which were resolved on other procedural grounds. See supra note 146.
167 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court rules on government applications for approval of electronic
surveillance, physical search, and other investigative actions for foreign intelligence purposes.
168 This difference was statistically significant at the .05 level.
169 See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d
498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc); In re Application of United States for Hist. Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 612
(5th Cir. 2013); In re Application of United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Svc. to
Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010).
170 Compare In re Application of United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)–(d), 42 F. Supp. 3d
511, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 401 (D. Md. 2012), with In re Application
of United States for Hist. Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 846 (S.D. Tex. 2010); In re Application of United
States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Svc. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 534 F. Supp.
2d 585 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
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arguments, because the cost of doing so is low and the reward for success (overturning a
conviction) is substantial. 171 Moreover, the low costs of appealing decisions and the high
burden for reversing a lower court often lead to low win rates for appellants in a variety of
contexts. 172
Appendix Table A reports the outcomes of all state cases applying Carpenter, and the
number and win rate of cases that reach a determinative, yes-or-no ruling on whether a
government action was a Fourth Amendment search. 173 Of note, Massachusetts courts
resolved a somewhat disproportionate number of Carpenter cases, and Massachusetts could be
fairly characterized as a leader in state court applications of Carpenter. Its cases often addressed
important new surveillance technologies, and its opinions typically reflect a balanced and
nuanced approach to these issues. 174 Pennsylvania and Texas have likewise played important
roles in applying and interpreting Carpenter in the state courts. 175

III. THE ROLE OF THE C ARPENTER FACTORS
This Part addresses the potential Carpenter factors discussed above. It examines how
courts use the factors in reaching Fourth Amendment decisions, and attempts to discern which
factors drive decisions and which do not. There were 399 rulings applying Carpenter in the
dataset. In 182 of these decisions, courts resolved the case based on the good faith exception
or other grounds such as harmless error. 176 Only a handful of these cases mention any of the
Carpenter factors, and they generally do not address them in depth. 177 Let us set those good
faith and other grounds cases aside for now.
There were 217 decisions that reached a determinative, yes-or-no ruling on a Fourth
Amendment search under Carpenter. Of these, 129 decisions mentioned at least one of the
Carpenter factors in reaching a judgment. In 112 of these decisions, the court made clear that
one or more factors favored or disfavored the party seeking to establish a Fourth Amendment
violation. 178 For example, in United States v. Trice, the Sixth Circuit found that the amount factor
Kessler et al., supra note 138, at 246.
Id.
173 See infra Appendix.
174 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d 1090, 1106–07 (Mass. 2020) (applying Carpenter in case
addressing automatic license plate cameras); Commonwealth v. Norman, 142 N.E.3d 1, 3, 6–7 (Mass. 2020)
(applying Carpenter to evaluate GPS device imposed as a pretrial condition of release).
175 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 227 A.3d 358, 369–70 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020) (applying Carpenter in case
involving real-time location data); State v. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d 278, 288 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (applying
Carpenter to address the analysis of defendant’s blood sample originally taken for medical purposes).
176 See supra notes 146, 148.
177 See, e.g., United States v. James, No. 18-cr-216, 2018 WL 6566000, at *1, *4 (D. Minn. Nov. 26, 2018).
178 Of these cases, 29 (25.7%) ultimately found a Fourth Amendment search, and 84 (74.3%) found no search.
The lower win rate in this subset of cases is likely attributable to the fact that courts were more likely to engage
with the Carpenter factors in frontier cases involving new legal issues. Several of the cases that did not engage with
any factor involved historical cell phone location information, or other forms of data closely analogous to those
addressed in Carpenter, and therefore win rates in that subset were higher. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, No.
3284 EDA 2019, 2020 WL 6538814, at *1, *8 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 2020) (holding that the collection of
historical cell site data was a Fourth Amendment search without considering any of the factors).
171
172
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disfavored the defendant. 179 In Trice, police officers installed a hidden camera near a suspect’s
apartment door and recorded four short clips of footage over a six-hour period. 180 The court
noted that this brief use of a camera captured far less data than the detailed, prolonged cell
phone tracking at issue in Carpenter. 181 Ultimately, the court ruled that the use of the camera
was not a Fourth Amendment search. 182
Cases like these are particularly important, as they involve courts using their
interpretations of Carpenter to determine whether a novel technology or surveillance practice
violated the Fourth Amendment. By examining these decisions, we can assess how each factor
influences Fourth Amendment case outcomes.
A.

Factor Analysis

This section examines in more detail the cases where courts applied one or more Carpenter
factors in a way that favored or disfavored finding a search. Courts cited a variety of factors
in cases resolving Carpenter questions, but rarely discussed all or most of the factors together. 183
Instead, courts often discussed the factors that influenced their reasoning and ignored the
other factors, even when those factors might have pointed in the same direction. 184 This
reflects the absence of a clear doctrinal command regarding the specific standard that courts
should apply. 185 The ambiguity of Carpenter gives courts license to consider all, some, or none
of the factors as they see fit. 186
Courts’ intermittent discussion of the factors makes the process of calculating the relative
impact of each factor more complex. 187 But similar patterns emerge from a variety of analyses
of the data, ranging from a simple count of the factors and their outcomes to a correlation
United States v. Trice, 966 F.3d 506, 519 (6th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1395 (2021).
Id. at 511. The camera activated whenever the apartment door was opened, and recorded several minutes of
footage in total. Id. at 519.
181 Id. at 518–19.
182 Id. at 520. The court also considered the revealing nature and cost factors in reaching its decision, as well as
more classic Katz-style reasonable expectation of privacy concepts. Id. at 512–20.
183 It was also surprisingly rare for courts to cite the sentence summarizing the Supreme Court’s reasoning and
mentioning most of the Carpenter factors: “In light of the deeply revealing nature of CSLI, its depth, breadth, and
comprehensive reach, and the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection, the fact that such information
is gathered by a third party does not make it any less deserving of Fourth Amendment protection.” Carpenter v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018). Only a handful of cases actually quoted this passage. See, e.g., State v.
Sylvestre, 254 So. 3d 986, 991 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting the passage in part).
184 For example, in State v. Sylvestre, 254 So. 3d 986 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018), a case where the government pinged
the defendant’s cell phone with a cell site simulator to discover his location, the appeals court discussed the
revealing nature the data captured, but did not the mention the inescapable or automatic nature of the collection,
even though those factors would have further supported the court’s ruling and even though the court had just
quoted the Supreme Court mentioning those factors. See supra note 183.
185 Contrary to some expectations, courts have not yet interpreted Carpenter to establish a clear test. Cf. Ohm,
supra note 2, at 369 (predicting that “judges will [use] a new, multi-factor test” promulgated in Carpenter); Tokson,
supra note 13, at 6 (positing that the Carpenter opinion provided a coherent legal standard that would likely govern
future Fourth Amendment cases). However, a test is beginning to emerge from the accumulation of lower court
interpretations, as discussed in this Part and in Part IV.A.1 infra.
186 See supra Part I.D.
187 See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
179
180
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analysis relating each factor to case outcomes, to a more complex statistical examination of
the interaction of the factors. In each analysis, the revealing nature, amount of data collected,
and automatic nature of data disclosure emerge as the most prevalent and influential factors
in the Carpenter analysis. The number of persons affected has little to no influence on case
outcomes. The remaining factors of inescapability and cost exert influence when they appear,
but are only occasionally discussed by courts in the dataset.
1.

Factor Prevalence

Due to courts’ non-comprehensive discussion of the factors, it is important to consider
how frequently each factor is addressed in the dataset. The factors that are most influential are
likely to be the most frequently discussed, and the least influential factors least frequently. Of
course, it is also important to assess how persuasive a factor is when it is discussed. This
section describes the overall frequency and apparent impact of the various factors in the
dataset. Subsequent sections analyze the influence of the factors using statistical techniques.
The factors are underlined below for clarity.
The revealing nature of the data collected was mentioned in 93 total decisions. In cases
reaching a determinative decision, revealing nature was found to favor a search ruling in 23
cases and disfavor a search ruling in 47 cases. 188 In 69 of these 70 cases, the court reached the
decision indicated by the revealing nature factor, a rate of 98.6%. 189 Courts almost never failed
to find a search after determining that surveilled data was revealing, and never found a search
after determining that surveilled data was unrevealing.
The amount of data collected was even more prevalent, mentioned in 116 total decisions.
In cases reaching a determinative decision, amount was found to favor a search ruling in 18
cases and disfavor a search ruling in 59 cases. In 71 of these 77 cases, the court reached the
decision indicated by the amount factor, a rate of 92.2%. 190
The automatic nature of data disclosure was mentioned in 61 total cases. In cases reaching
a determinative decision, automatic disclosure was found to favor a search ruling in 8 cases
and disfavor a search ruling in 38 cases. In 44 of these 46 cases, the court reached the decision
indicated by the automatic factor, a rate of 95.7%. 191 Of the three most prominent factors, the
automatic factor had the greatest tendency to disfavor a search ruling. When courts assessed
the automaticity of data disclosures, they usually concluded that the disclosure at issue was not
automatic, and therefore the data was unlikely to be protected by the Fourth Amendment.

188 Factors were coded as favoring or disfavoring a search when courts applying the factor overtly concluded that
the factor supported or cut against the defendant in the instant case. See, e.g., notes 178–182 and accompanying
text.
189 The one case where the revealing nature factor favored a search but the court ultimately found no search was
United States v. Howard, 426 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1251 (M.D. Ala. 2019).
190 See, e.g., United States v. Trice, 966 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Diggs, 385 F. Supp. 3d 648, 652
(N.D. Ill. 2019).
191 See, e.g., State v. Eads, 154 N.E.3d 538, 548 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020); United States v. Schaefer, No. 3:17-CR00400-HZ, 2019 WL 267711, at *1, *5 (D. Or. Jan. 17, 2019).
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The inescapable nature of the technology or surveillance at issue was mentioned in 36
total cases. In cases reaching a determinative decision, inescapability was found to favor a
search ruling in 2 cases and disfavor a search ruling in 14 cases. In 15 of these 16 cases, the
court reached the decision indicated by the inescapability factor, a rate of 93.8%. 192 The
inescapability factor was the factor most likely to favor the government when addressed by
courts, with an even higher rate of indicating no search than the automatic factor. 193
The cost of surveillance was mentioned in 34 total cases. In cases reaching a determinative
decision, cost was found to favor a search ruling in 9 cases and disfavor a search ruling in 6
cases. In 13 of these 15 cases, the court reached the decision indicated by the cost factor, a
rate of 86.7%. 194 The cost of surveillance was the factor most likely to favor defendants when
addressed by courts. 195
Finally, the number of persons surveilled was mentioned in only 15 total decisions. In
cases reaching a determinative decision, number was found to favor a search ruling in 5 cases
and disfavor a search ruling in 1 case. In 3 of these 6 cases, the court reached the decision
indicated by the number factor, a rate of 50.0%. Further, 3 of the 6 cases discussing the number
factor expressly rejected the idea that the number of persons affected should matter for
determining a Fourth Amendment search. For example, in United States v. Patterson, a federal
district court found that a court order for “tower dump” data revealing every cell phone near
a cell tower at a certain time was not a Fourth Amendment search under Carpenter. 196 The court
overtly rejected the claim that the number of people affected by the tower dump was of
constitutional concern, stating that the defendants cannot invoke “the rights of non-parties
[who] are also impacted by tower dumps [and] cannot suppress evidence based on alleged
violations of someone else’s privacy interest.” 197 Given the lower courts’ almost complete
eschewal of the number factor, this is likely an accurate description of post-Carpenter law.
2.

Correlation Analysis

Correlation analysis can shed light on the influence that the Carpenter factors have on case
outcomes, as well as interactions among the factors themselves. This Section examines the
entire dataset of 217 determinative decisions, 88 of which do not address any of the factors.
Even including these 88 cases, many of the factors have statistically significant correlations
with case outcomes.

See, e.g., State v. Mixton, 478 P.3d 1227, 1233–34 (Ariz. 2021); United States v. Trader, 981 F.3d 961, 967, 969
(11th Cir. 2020).
193 Automatic nature favored the government in 82.6% of cases, while inescapability favored the government in
87.5% of cases.
194 See, e.g., State v. Muhammad, 451 P.3d 1060, 1071–72 (Wash. 2019); United States v. Kidd, 394 F. Supp. 3d
357, 365–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
195 Cost favored finding a search in 60.0% of cases.
196 United States v. Patterson, No. 4:19CR3011, 2020 WL 6334399, at *1, *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 5, 2020) (holding
also, in the alternative, that the good faith exception would apply even if defendants were correct).
197 Id.
192
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Table 3 reports the correlation coefficients for each factor and the overall case outcome,
and the correlation coefficients for each factor with every other factor. 198 These results indicate
that the revealing nature and amount factors were most strongly correlated with case
outcomes, followed by automatic disclosure, cost, and inescapability. The number of persons
affected was not meaningfully correlated with case outcomes. These results are generally
consistent with the counts reported above—both suggest a major role for the revealing nature
and amount factors, a substantial role for automatic disclosure, and a notable but lesser role
for cost and inescapability.
Table 3
Correlations between the Carpenter Factors and Outcome, and between the Factors Themselves
Case
Outcome

Revealing

Amount

Number

Inescap.

Automatic

Case
Outcome

-

Revealing

.527***

-

Amount

.449***

0.563***

-

Number

.036

0.122

.087

-

Inescap.

0.188**

0.270***

0.207**

.023

-

Automatic

0.361***

0.314***

0.248***

.035

0.408***

-

Cost

0.220**

0.294***

0.328***

.100

.011

.097

Cost

-

*significant at the .05 level **significant at the .01 level ***significant at the .001 level

There were significant correlations among most of the factors, though there were no
correlations between number and any other factor. Cost was not correlated with the
inescapability or automatic factors. There were particularly strong correlations between
revealing nature and amount, and between those factors and cost. Likewise, there was a strong
correlation between the inescapability and automatic factors. These factors are conceptually
related, as they both concern the voluntary nature of a person’s disclosure of data to a third
party. 199
198 The factors were specified as trinary explanatory variables, coded as favors a search (1), disfavors a search (-1),
or is neutral (0). The case outcome is a binary response variable coded as Search (1), or No Search (0). See generally
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, U. PA. L. REV. 549, 584–85 (2008)
(performing a similar correlation analysis).
199 Tokson, supra note 2, at 421–22.
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3.

Logistic Regression Analysis

Table 4 reports the results of a logistic regression analysis of case outcomes as a function
of the various factors discussed above. 200 Controlling for the effects of the other factors,
revealing nature has the most powerful influence on case outcomes, followed by automatic
nature, and then amount. The remaining factors have no statistically significant effect on case
outcomes when controlling for the other factors.
Table 4
Logistic Regression of Case Outcomes as a Function of the Carpenter Factors
95% C.I.
Lower Upper

Odds Ratio

Coefficient

Standard
Error

p

38.041***

3.639***

1.089

<.001

1.505

5.773

Amount

7.338**

1.993**

.671

.003

.678

3.308

Number

.560

-.581

3.056

.849

-6.571

5.409

Inescapability

5.059

1.621

4.712

.731

-7.615

10.857

22.102**

3.096**

1.069

.004

1.001

5.191

7.201

1.974

5.145

.701

-8.110

12.058

Revealing

Automatic
Cost

*significant at the .05 level **significant at the .01 level ***significant at the .001 level

These regression results should be interpreted with some caution, as judicial discussion
of the factors is intermittent and the factors only occasionally conflict with each other in the
dataset. 201 There is also some risk of collinearity between the factors, especially revealing nature
and amount. 202 Still, the model fits the observed data well, particularly with respect to the
The cases used for this regression were the 217 determinative, yes-or-no cases in the dataset. As with the
correlation analysis, the factors were specified as trinary explanatory variables, coded as favors a search (1),
disfavors a search (-1), or is neutral (0). The case outcome is a binary response variable coded as Search (1), or
No Search (0). See generally Beebe, supra note 198, at 584–85 (performing a similar analysis).
Similar regression results were obtained when using the smaller set of 112 cases that evaluate a factor or
factors as favoring or disfavoring an outcome. Likewise, similar results on both sets were obtained using a Firth’s
biased-reduced logistic regression, which is sometimes used on datasets involving variables that are very strongly
associated with observed outcomes. See, e.g., Cornell Stat. Consulting Unit, Separation and Convergence Issues in Logistic
Regression, STATNEWS, https://cscu.cornell.edu/wp-content/uploads/82_lgsbias.pdf (last updated Sept. 2020).
201 Cf. supra note 200 (discussing alternative methods of regression that ultimately reach similar results as the
above regression).
202 Collinearity refers to variables that move in tandem, providing the same or similar information. Revealing
nature and amount are highly correlated although not perfectly collinear. Due to collinearity, it may be difficult
200
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subset of cases that applied at least one factor. 203 Further, the outcome of the regression
analysis is consistent with those of the other analyses—revealing nature, amount, and
automatic disclosure are the most influential factors, with the rest trailing behind. 204
B.

Cases Applying No Factors

There were 88 cases where courts issued a determinative ruling on a Fourth Amendment
search but did not mention any of the Carpenter factors. There are several reasons why courts
might resolve a case under Carpenter without analyzing these factors. Many of these 88 cases
involved fairly obvious decisions, cases involving digital location data closely analogous to that
addressed in Carpenter, or issues resolved in previous Fourth Amendment cases that were
expressly affirmed in Carpenter. 205 In some other cases, courts interpreted Carpenter narrowly or
minimized its impact on Fourth Amendment law, generally in the course of finding no
search. 206
Finally, some cases in the dataset were largely resolved under the classic Katz test approach
rather than the newer Carpenter paradigm. 207 More broadly, even in cases that consider the
Carpenter factors in depth, courts typically reference the Katz framework and discuss whether
the target of surveillance had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 208 There is no indication that
Carpenter has misplaced or usurped Katz as the primary framework of Fourth Amendment
search law, as some commentators predicted. 209 Rather, Carpenter has augmented or modified
the Katz inquiry while leaving its general framework in place. 210

to precisely disaggregate their respective influence on case outcomes in a regression analysis. Dropping revealing
nature from the model would increase the coefficient of the amount variable to 2.385, but reduce the effectiveness
of the model. Variance inflation factors for the full model were all under 2, indicating that collinearity was not a
major problem with the model. Nonetheless, correlations between several of the independent factors were
substantial. See supra Part III.A.2.
203 The Pseudo-R2 of the model was .809 for the set of all cases that apply at least one factor, and was .400 for
all determinative cases, including the 88 cases that do not mention any factor.
204 See supra Part.III.A.1.
205 See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, No. 19-cr-320, 2020 WL 4727429, at *1, *6–*7 (D. Minn. Aug. 14, 2020)
(holding that the collection of historical cell site data was a Fourth Amendment search); McGee v. United States,
No. 5:13CR23, 2019 WL 1440308, at *1, *2 (N.D.W. Va. Mar. 29, 2019) (relying on prior Supreme Court case to
conclude that the Fourth Amendment did not protect telephone call logs); United States v. Moiseev, 364 F. Supp.
3d 23, 25 (D. Mass. 2019) (relying on a prior Supreme Court case to hold that there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy in financial records held by banks).
206 See, e.g., United States v. Holt, No. 15-CR-0245-WJM-NYW, 2018 WL 7238196, at *1, *8 (D. Colo. July 9,
2018).
207 See, e.g., United States v. Fanning, No. 1:18-CR-362-AT-CMS, 2019 BL 303005, at *1, *4 (N.D. Ga. May 28,
2019).
208 See, e.g., United States v. Gayden, 977 F.3d 1146, 1151 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Gbenedio, No. 1:17CR-430-TWT-JSA, 2019 WL 2177943, at *1, *1–2 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2019). See generally Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
209 See Ohm, supra note 2, at 385 (contending that the Katz test was “has been replaced by Carpenter’s multi-factor
test”).
210 The cases where courts reach determinative conclusions about a Fourth Amendment search but do not
mention any of the Carpenter factors are in part a reflection of the continuing viability of the general Katz
framework.
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C.

Digital-Age Technology as a Factor

Orin Kerr has argued that Carpenter is best interpreted as applying only to types of data
that are unique to the digital age. 211 Under this approach, surveillance involving pre-digital
records or their digital equivalents would not be a search under Carpenter. 212 Kerr notes that
the Supreme Court considered cell phone location information “an entirely different species”
of data, emblematic of the “new concerns wrought by digital technology” and therefore not
covered by existing precedents. 213 The Court also made clear that it did not intend to overturn
its pre-digital precedents or “call into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools,
such as security cameras.” 214 Although the principles that shaped Carpenter would seem to apply
to any form of surveillance, the Court’s caution at least suggests the possibility that it intended
to limit the reach of its new approach to digital-age forms of technology. 215
However, there is little evidence in the dataset that courts consider digital age technology
a requirement for Fourth Amendment protection under Carpenter. Courts extended protection
to non-digital data in several cases. 216 And only one case in the entire dataset mentioned the
digital nature of data as a consideration. 217 There is, however, evidence for a more subtle
relationship between digital technology and case outcomes.
Of the 217 cases that reached a determinative ruling on a Fourth Amendment search, 158
involved digital-age data such as IP addresses, cell-site location data, or websurfing data. 218
Courts found a search in 57 of these cases, a rate of 36.1%. There were 59 cases that involved
pre-digital data or its equivalents, such as video recordings or financial information. Courts
found a search in 9 of these, a rate of 15.3%. The difference in win rates suggests that courts
are more inclined to find a search in cases involving digital technologies than in cases involving
non-digital technologies. However, these results also suggest that courts do apply Carpenter to
non-digital data, and sometimes find that government collection of this data is a search under
Carpenter. 219 For example, in People v. Tafoya, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the use
of a surveillance camera to observe the curtilage of a person’s home for a three-month period
was a Fourth Amendment search that required a warrant. 220 In addition, the lower defendant
win rate in non-digital-technology cases may reflect the fact that these cases frequently involve
Kerr, supra note 13, at 16.
See id.
213 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2222 (2018).
214 Id. at 2220.
215 Kerr, supra note 13, at 16.
216 E.g., State v. Eads, 154 N.E.3d 538, 541 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020) (extending Fourth Amendment protection to
blood and urine samples taken for medical purposes); State v. Bunce, No. 119,048, 2020 WL 122642, at *1, *4
(Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2020) (extending Fourth Amendment protection to the warrantless search of a purse).
217 United States v. Tuggle, No. 16-cr-20070-JES-JEH, 2019 WL 3915998, at *1, *1–*2 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2019).
218 See, e.g., People v. Sime, 62 Misc. 3d 429, 433–34 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2018) (holding that defendant lacked a
privacy interest in “the IP data and photograph metadata” she uploaded to a photo and video social networking
service).
219 See supra note 216.
220 People v. Tafoya, No. 17CA1243, 2019 WL 6333762, at *1, *10 (Colo. App. Nov. 27, 2019), cert. granted, No.
20SC9, 2020 WL 4343762 (Colo. June 27, 2020). While modern surveillance cameras may use digital video, such
video is the equivalent of the pre-digital technology of videotape cameras. See Kerr, supra note 13, at 16.
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types of surveillance that have already been clearly established as non-searches, such as
government subpoenas for financial records. 221
Statistical analysis of the relationship between digital technologies and findings of a search
indicates suggests a significant relationship between the digital nature of the data at issue and
courts’ rulings on Fourth Amendment protection. The correlation coefficient for digital
technology and case outcomes is .248, which is statistically significant at the .001 level. 222
Running a logistic regression analysis with the digital variable indicates that digital technology
has a statistically significant influence on case outcomes, even when controlling for the other
Carpenter factors. 223 Lower courts have not adopted an interpretation of Carpenter that would
limit its protection exclusively to digital data. 224 But digital data is more likely to be protected
than non-digital data in cases applying Carpenter. 225

IV. THE FUTURE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW
The analysis above examines the present state of Fourth Amendment law. This Part traces
current trends into the future, examining the myriad implications of the analysis for the next
generation of Fourth Amendment issues. A multi-factor Carpenter test has begun to emerge
from the lower court cases, and this Part identifies it and discusses the ambiguities that still
remain. It also examines how the changing Supreme Court is likely to address Carpenter in the
future and in light of various Justices’ prior Fourth Amendment rulings. It then examines
evidence of indirect noncompliance with Carpenter and describes the cognitive and practical
influences that may cause judicial inertia in the face of legal change.
Further, the good faith exception accounts for a remarkably high proportion of cases
applying Carpenter, and this study’s findings should cause courts to rethink the exception,
especially in situations involving new technologies. There were also over 120 state court rulings
applying federal constitutional law in the dataset, and this Part examines the institutional
advantages, disadvantages, and unique approaches of the state courts in adjudicating federal
rights. Finally, this Part offers a variety of prescriptive suggestions for courts and lawmakers
to more effectively apply the Fourth Amendment to new surveillance practices.

See, e.g., Darcy v. United States, 1:17-cr-00036-MR-WCM, 2021 WL 92968, at *1, *5 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 11, 2021).
Like the correlation coefficients reported above, this is the correlation between digital technology and a
holding of search or no search in the dataset.
223 The coefficient for digital technology was 2.500 (lower confidence interval 1.097, upper confidence interval
3.903) and the p-value was <.001. Coefficients and p-values for the other factors in this regression model are
similar to those reported in Tbl. 4, with revealing nature, amount, and automaticity all exerting a statistically
significant effect on case outcomes.
224 See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
225 The odds ratio for digital data was 12.183, indicating that the presence of digital data makes it roughly 12 times
as likely that a court will find a search. These regression results should be interpreted cautiously, however, and
not taken as exact estimates. See supra notes 201–202 and accompanying text.
221
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A.

The Emerging Carpenter Test and the Changing Court
1.

The Carpenter Test

To the extent that the Carpenter opinion set out a test for Fourth Amendment searches
involving third parties, it was ambiguous and vague. 226 Yet a relatively clear Carpenter test has
begun to emerge, as lower courts have applied the case hundreds of times to resolve new
Fourth Amendment issues. The test involves at least three factors: the revealing nature of the
data captured, the amount of data captured, and whether the data was disclosed to a third
party automatically. 227 In cases where the government obtains a substantial amount of
revealing data that was collected automatically from a user, courts will very likely find a search
going forward. 228 When the government obtains relatively little data, with little capability of
revealing the intimate details of a person’s life, and does so from a third party to whom a user
has voluntarily turned over their data, courts will very likely find no search. 229
What about when the factors point in different directions? That remains uncertain, and
will be left to future courts to determine in individual cases. This Article’s analysis would
predict, however, that revealing nature would likely prevail over the amount or automatic
factors in cases where they conflict, because revealing nature was more influential in analyses
of the dataset. 230 It would tentatively predict that amount would prevail over the automatic
nature of disclosure, because amount was more prevalent in the dataset and more directly
correlated with case outcomes, although automaticity was more influential in a regression
analysis. 231 There is some support for these predictions in the cases observed, but given the
small number of cases expressly addressing conflicts between the factors, any conclusion about
the relative weights of the factors is necessarily preliminary. 232 In any event, all three factors
See supra Part I.D.
See supra Part I.C.
228 See, e.g., State v. Rone, 2018 WL 4482462, at *1, *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 2018); State v. Phillip, 452 P.3d
553, 560 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020).
229 See, e.g., United States v. Tolbert, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1225 (D.N.M. 2018); Bailey v. State, 311 So. 3d 303,
314–16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020).
230 Revealing nature was the most influential factor by any measure. See supra Part III.A.1.
231 The amount of data collected factor was far more prevalent in the dataset than the automatic factor, and had
a similarly high rate of influencing case outcomes when applied. See supra Part III.A. It was also more strongly
correlated with case outcomes than was automaticity in a statistical correlation analysis. See supra Tbl. 3. Its
regression coefficient was smaller, but the statistical significance of its influence as a factor was slightly greater
than that of automaticity, see supra Tbl. 4, and in any event the regression analysis should be interpreted cautiously,
see supra notes 201–202 and accompanying text. Regression might also understate the influence of amount due to
its collinearity with the revealing nature factor; the two factors were strongly correlated in the dataset, and as a
result it may be difficult to disaggregate their respective influence on case outcomes in a regression analysis.
232 See In re Google Location Hist. Litig., No. 5:18-CV-05062-EJD, 2021 WL 519380, at *1, *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25,
2021) (noting credible allegations of mostly user-directed disclosures of data, albeit allegedly without informed
user consent, but relying on collection of a large amount of revealing data in finding a reasonable expectation of
privacy under Carpenter); People v. Bui, No. H044430, 2019 WL 1325260, at *1, *18–*21 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 25,
2019) (finding that real-time data was obtained automatically from a suspect but holding that it was not protected
by the Fourth Amendment in light of the small amount of data obtained). But see People v. Simpson, 62 Misc. 3d
374, 384 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018) (finding a search where the government obtained only three days of cell phone
location data and noting the automatic nature of the data disclosure).
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appear to matter substantially to case outcomes.
It is similarly clear that the number of persons affected by a surveillance act does not
matter to case outcomes. Few courts mention this factor, case outcomes frequently go against
it, and some courts overtly reject it. 233 This apparent repudiation of the number factor is likely
due to its unconventional nature as a litigation consideration. Courts habitually apply standing
and other doctrines to ensure that parties are only asserting their own interests, or the interests
of a well-represented class, in litigation. 234 The concept of a single litigant raising the prospect
of harms to numerous non-litigants is too outlandish for most courts. As one judge stated,
“this is not the appropriate venue” for such an argument. 235 The number of people affected
by a surveillance practice may also be difficult to discern in some cases, and courts may be
reluctant to engage in that inquiry.
Whether the cost and inescapability factors will ultimately be part of the Carpenter test
remains to be determined. Lower courts have not yet adopted these factors in substantial
numbers, but have also not overtly rejected them. 236 They may ultimately be incorporated into
the Carpenter test in some form, in part because they are conceptually related to some of the
stronger factors. The inescapability of a technology or type of surveillance is related to the
automatic nature of disclosure—both speak to whether the disclosure of personal data to a
third party is voluntary. 237 And cost is conceptually related to amount because it is generally
the low-cost gathering of data at scale that raises the most serious concerns about new
surveillance technologies, as the Supreme Court has noted several times. 238 Courts might
eventually combine these factors with the factors of amount and automaticity, or may
separately evaluate them as part of a comprehensive assessment of a surveillance practice.
Alternatively, they may continue to largely ignore them.
2.

The Future of the Supreme Court

The future of Carpenter as a transformative precedent is uncertain in part because the
United States v. Patterson, No. 4:19CR3011, 2020 WL 6334399, at *1, *3 (D. Neb. Aug. 5, 2020) (rejecting an
argument that the Fourth Amendment interests of non-litigant parties affected by surveillance should matter in
the analysis); Commonwealth v. Dunkins, 229 A.3d 622, 629 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020), appeal granted, 237 A.3d 415
(Pa. 2020) (concluding that the widespread nature of the surveillance made it less likely to be a Fourth
Amendment search); United States v. Shipton, No. 0:18-CR-202-PJS-KMM, 2019 WL 5330928, at *1, *15 (D.
Minn. Sept. 11, 2019) (rejecting the idea that a litigant could invoke the Fourth Amendment interests of nonlitigant parties affected by surveillance).
234 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (setting out several requirements for constitutional
standing); Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997) (holding that a class in a class action lawsuit
must be sufficiently well-defined to ensure all class member interests are aligned).
235 Shipton, 2019 WL 5330928, at *15.
236 See supra Part III.A.1.
237 See Tokson, supra note 2, at 422.
238 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429–30 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing the
“difficult and costly” structural barriers that new, low-cost surveillance has removed from government
surveillance); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217–18 (2018) (noting the threats to privacy that arise
because “cell phone tracking is remarkably easy, cheap, and efficient compared to traditional investigative tools.”).
See also Tokson, supra note 40, at 23–25.
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composition of the Supreme Court has changed since June 2018. Carpenter was a 5–4 decision,
with Justices Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan in the majority and Kennedy,
Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch dissenting. 239 Justice Kennedy’s seat is now occupied by Justice
Kavanaugh, and Justice Ginsburg’s seat is now occupied by Justice Barrett. What does this all
mean for the future of Carpenter and the new test emerging in the lower courts?
It is likely that Carpenter will remain a valid precedent and that its reasoning will be used
to expand the scope of the Fourth Amendment to a variety of new technologies and
surveillance practices. But the future is uncertain, and support for robust Fourth Amendment
protection has likely decreased somewhat since 2018.
First, Carpenter is unlikely to be overruled in whole or in part. Overruling a recent decision
is generally difficult to justify. 240 Moreover, as this Article has demonstrated, Carpenter has not
proven unworkable in the lower courts. 241 To the contrary, lower courts have applied it in
hundreds of cases, offering little overt criticism of its unique approach242 and frequently using
the Carpenter factors to explain and support their decisions. 243 To be sure, courts have not yet
adopted a stable Carpenter test requiring a discussion of each factor in every case. 244
Establishing a mandatory test is likely a job for the Supreme Court itself. And some courts
have tended to favor an older, more pro-government approach in dealing with data disclosed
to third-parties. 245 But judicial inertia is a common phenomenon when judges confront legal
change, especially in the absence of a clear command from a higher court. 246 Despite the
ambiguity of the Carpenter opinion, lower courts have had little difficulty examining
considerations like the revealing nature of data, the amount of data captured, the automatic
Each of the dissenting Justices wrote their own opinions, suggesting a strong albeit diverse set of views
opposing Carpenter. Justices Thomas and Alito joined Kennedy’s dissent, while Thomas also joined Alito’s dissent.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223–35 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2235–46 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2246–61
(Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2261–72 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
240 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (stating that substantial changes in
law or facts over a long period of time are two of the four primary grounds that justify overruling a precedent);
Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“[W]e have a profound obligation to give recently decided cases the strongest presumption of
validity.”).
241 Unworkability in the lower courts is a hallmark of a case that should be overturned despite the interests of
stare decisis. E.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 854; Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
242 There were only two opinions in the dataset that appeared overtly critical of Carpenter. See United States v.
Robinson, No. 7:18-CR-00103-FL-1, 2020 BL 126361, at *1, *7 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 5, 2020) (critiquing Carpenter as
contrary to an originalist understanding of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Howard, 426 F. Supp. 3d
1247, 1253 (M.D. Ala. 2019) (criticizing Carpenter as vague and failing to give courts clear guidance going forward).
Even separate opinions directly criticizing Carpenter were rare. Cf. Holder v. State, 595 S.W.3d 691, 706 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2020) (Yeary, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that the court should not have incorporated
Carpenter into Texas constitutional law given a prior Texas ruling endorsing the third-party doctrine). There were
also a few concurrences in cases that did not substantively apply Carpenter which criticized Katz and all of modern
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on originalist grounds. See Mobley v. State, 816 S.E.2d 769, 776 (Ga. Ct. App.
2018) (Dillard, C.J., concurring specially), rev’d, 834 S.E.2d 785 (Ga. 2019), and vacated, 839 S.E.2d 199 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2020); Morgan v. Fairfield Cnty., Ohio, 903 F.3d 553, 570 (6th Cir. 2018) (Thapar, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
243 See supra Part III.A.
244 Id.
245 See infra Part IV.B.
246 Id.
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and inescapable nature of data disclosure, and the cost of surveillance. 247 Courts regularly
address these factors in cases involving novel technologies, fruitfully comparing those
technologies with the cell phone tracking addressed in Carpenter. 248 Whether the Carpenter
standard is normatively desirable remains subject to debate, but there is little evidence that it
lacks workability.
Second, the Court is likely to use and expand on the Carpenter approach in future cases.
Justices Roberts, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan will likely continue to apply Carpenter and pay
close attention to the doctrinal developments in the lower courts over the past several years. 249
They will probably support regulating surveillance practices that involve collecting large
amounts of revealing data, especially if the data was automatically gathered by third parties.
Justice Gorsuch would prefer to discard the Katz test altogether and resolve Fourth
Amendment cases on more overtly originalist grounds. 250 But Gorsuch nonetheless tended to
support strong Fourth Amendment protections in a variety of contexts as a lower court
judge. 251 And his dissent—which often read more like a concurrence—in Carpenter expressed
interest in a capacious conception of Fourth Amendment property that would encompass, for
instance, any business records that a cell phone service provider generates about an individual’s
cell phone use. 252 He critiqued the pro-government nature of the third-party doctrine and
suggested that bailment law principles and statutory law imposing limits on disclosures of
telecommunications information might give rise to a cognizable property right in personal data
held by third parties. 253 His dissent concluded by imploring future litigants to raise such
arguments, unlike Mr. Carpenter, whom Gorsuch “reluctantly” concluded had forfeited
them. 254
One potential future course for Fourth Amendment law is a series of fractured opinions,
where four Justices apply Carpenter directly while Justice Gorsuch concurs separately, applying
a different approach to reach a similar outcome: the protection of sensitive personal data held
by third parties. 255 It is also possible, if less likely, that Justices Barrett or Kavanaugh will join
either the Carpenter-applying majority or a pro-privacy Gorsuch concurrence. Justice Barrett
has generally ruled in favor of Fourth Amendment protection in her few rulings on the subject
as a lower court judge. 256 She also spoke favorably of Carpenter and its application of the Fourth
See supra Part III.A.
See, e.g., Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 2018); People v.
Tafoya, No. 17CA1243, 2019 WL 6333762, at *1, *8 (Colo. App. Nov. 27, 2019).
249 See Matthew Tokson, Predicting the Supreme Court’s Next Moves: Fourth Amendment Edition, DORF ON L. (Jan. 29,
2021, 7:30 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2021/01/predicting-supreme-courts-next-moves.html.
250 Id.; Orin Kerr, Katz as Originalism, 71 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2021).
251 Amy Howe, Gorsuch and the Fourth Amendment, SCOTUS BLOG (Mar. 17, 2017, 1:35 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/gorsuch-fourth-amendment.
252 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2268–69 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
253 Id. at 2272.
254 Id.
255 Tokson, supra note 249.
256 Jacob Sullum, SCOTUS Contender Amy Coney Barrett’s Mixed Record in Criminal Cases, REASON (Sept. 21, 2020,
4:45 PM), https://reason.com/2020/09/21/scotus-contender-amy-coney-barretts-mixed-record-in-criminal247
248
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Amendment to cell phones at her confirmation hearing. 257 Justice Kavanaugh might have a
narrower conception of the Fourth Amendment’s scope, but his recent majority vote in Torres
v. Madrid suggests that he may be open to broader interpretations of the Fourth Amendment
when they are supported by precedent and compelling policy or equitable considerations. 258
The future of the Court is always uncertain, and its composition is inherently subject to
change. What is clear is that Carpenter will likely remain a valid precedent, and a substantial
number of current Justices will apply Carpenter in resolving new cases. The principles discussed
in Carpenter, and the test that has begun to emerge from the lower courts, will continue to
shape Fourth Amendment law for the foreseeable future.
B.

Judicial Noncompliance and Legal Change

Lower courts citing Carpenter have generally refrained from criticizing it or overtly
declining to apply it. 259 Nor are there many cases substantively addressing the third-party
doctrine that fail to cite Carpenter. 260 There were five such cases between June 2018 and March
2021, only one of which was arguably in tension with the Carpenter opinion. 261 In short, overt
lower court resistance to the groundbreaking Carpenter decision has been negligible.
cases. She might also adopt the approach of her mentor and former boss Justice Scalia, who generally favored a
broad Fourth Amendment scope under property concepts and in Katz test cases. See id. Accordingly, she might
join either the majority or Justice Gorsuch in upholding Fourth Amendment protection in future cases.
257
Amy Coney Barrett Senate Confirmation Hearing Day 2 Transcript, REV (Oct. 13, 2020),
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/amy-coney-barrett-senate-confirmation-hearing-day-2-transcript
(“[T]he Fourth Amendment . . . [is] written at a level of generality that’s specific enough to protect rights, but
general enough to be lasting so that when you’re talking about the constable banging at your door in 1791 as a
search or seizure, now we can apply it, as the court did in Carpenter versus the United States, to cell phones.”).
258 Torres v. Madrid, 141 S.Ct. 989, 1003 (2021) (holding that the shooting of a fleeing suspect that did not
impede the movement of the suspect was nonetheless a seizure under the Fourth Amendment). Kavanaugh
authored an influential dissent from a denial of rehearing en banc in a GPS tracking case where he suggested that
the use of a GPS device might be a Fourth Amendment search on property and trespass grounds. United States
v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769–70 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc). This
might indicate an openness to Justice Gorsuch’s property-based approach, or a reluctance to adopt amount-based
analyses of Fourth Amendment searches. See id. (“I also share Chief Judge Sentelle’s concern about the panel
opinion’s novel aggregation approach to Fourth Amendment analysis.”) Or it may just reflect his assessment that
pre-Carpenter Supreme Court precedent did not justify the D.C. Circuit’s innovative approach.
259 But see United States v. Robinson, No. 7:18-CR-00103-FL-1, 2020 BL 126361, at *1, *7 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 5,
2020) (criticizing Carpenter as contrary to the original public meaning of the Fourth Amendment’s text); United
States v. Howard, 426 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1253 (M.D. Ala. 2019) (criticizing Carpenter as vague and unclear).
260 Applying the same methods used for compiling the dataset, twenty-four total cases decided since June 2018
were located that mention a third-party doctrine but do not cite Carpenter v. United States. Typically, these cases
either mention the third-party doctrine only in passing or mention unrelated insurance law or standing law
doctrines. See, e.g., Durasevic v. Grange Ins. Co. of Mich., 780 F. App’x 271, 274 (6th Cir. 2019) (mentioning the
“innocent third-party doctrine” of insurance law); Berry v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, No. 17-CV-143-LM,
2018 WL 3468703, at *1, *5 (D.N.H. July 17, 2018) (mentioning the Fourth Amendment third-party doctrine in
passing).
261 See State v. Pauli, No. A19-1886, 2020 WL 7019328, at *1, *2–3 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2020) (adopting a
strong form of the third-party doctrine and holding that child pornography images stored on Dropbox in
violation of Dropbox’s terms of service were not protected by the Fourth Amendment). The other four cases
were United States v. McCabe, No. CR 20-106 (DWF/BRT), 2021 WL 1086106, at *1, *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 22,
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There was, however, circumstantial evidence of some courts engaging in indirect
noncompliance with Carpenter. 262 Indirect noncompliance refers to courts intentionally
misinterpreting controlling precedent in order to reach a preferred outcome. 263 In the dataset
of 217 determinative search decisions, 29 decisions (13.4%) applied a strong version of the
third-party doctrine that was arguably in tension with the Carpenter opinion, which imposed a
meaningful limit on that doctrine. 264 These opinions might represent a small pocket of
resistance towards Carpenter, albeit a subtle, indirect resistance. 265
But judicial inertia towards a prior status quo is a common phenomenon following a
major legal change, and its occurrence here should not be too surprising. 266 Carpenter changed
Fourth Amendment law substantially, replacing a bright-line rule (‘all data disclosed to a third
party is unprotected’) with an amorphous, flexible standard (‘some data disclosed to a third
party is protected, in light of these several factors’). 267 This is precisely the situation where
judges are most likely to prefer the prior status quo. 268 Judges confronting an unfamiliar new
standard that raises decision costs and increases uncertainty are likely to favor the prior
doctrine—at least until they grow more comfortable with the new one. 269 This effect has been

2021); United States v. Taylor, 935 F.3d 1279, 1285 n.4 (11th Cir. 2019), as corrected (Sept. 4, 2019); United States
v. Wilbert, 343 F. Supp. 3d 117, 121 (W.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 818 F. App’x 113 (2d Cir. 2020); United States v.
Bohannon, No. 19-CR-00039-CRB-1, 2020 WL 7319430, at *1, *5 n.5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2020).
262 See Tokson, supra note 26, at 907.
263 Id.
264 For a description of the coding methodology used here, see supra note 157. For a discussion of the limits that
Carpenter imposed on the third-party doctrine, see, e.g., Kerr, supra note 13, at 6.
265 Tokson, supra note 26, at 907.
266 Id. at 924–25. Note that, while some instances of judicial inertia may partially be the result of litigants ignoring
a new law and courts remaining unaware of it, that is not at issue in this instance. Cf. Diego A. Zambrano, Judicial
Mistakes in Discovery, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 197, 200 (2018) (noting the role that litigant mistakes play in judicial
noncompliance with new discovery procedures in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26). Each of the cases
considered here that may exhibit indirect noncompliance with Carpenter cite that case and thus demonstrate
judicial awareness of the relevant case.
267 See Caminker, supra note 14, at 439–40 (discussing the numerous, substantial ambiguities of the Carpenter
standard).
268 Tokson, supra note 26, at 924. This is especially true where, as here, judges can favor the prior doctrine without
overtly defying the new one. Carpenter leaves enough ambiguity about the continued role of the third-party
doctrine that courts endorsing a strong third-party doctrine are not overtly resisting Carpenter. At worst they are
contradicting its spirit, not its letter. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (emphasizing
the factually narrow nature of the decision and declining to overrule previous third-party doctrine cases).
269 Tokson, supra note 26, at 926–27.
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observed in areas including criminal sentencing, 270 patent remedies, 271 copyright fair use, 272
qualified immunity law, 273 and many more. 274
Moreover, as the theory would predict, indirect noncompliance with Carpenter appears to
be decreasing over time. 275 The proportion of determinative cases that invoke a strong thirdparty doctrine has gone down in recent years, as judges become more familiar with Carpenter. 276
Figure 2 reports the proportion of determinative cases citing Carpenter that apply a strong
version of the third-party doctrine, over time.

270 In the first several years after the Supreme Court deemed the federal sentencing guidelines non-mandatory,
most judges did not depart from the familiar guidelines and they continued to exert a powerful influence on
sentences. See supra note 15. This effect diminished over time, and judges eventually began to depart from the
sentencing guidelines at higher rates. Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencing After Booker, 48 CRIME & JUST. 137, 139–40
(2019).
271 See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of Ebay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006): A Review
of Subsequent Judicial Decisions, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 631, 655–57 (2007) (finding that a majority
of courts continued to apply an old, bright-line rule approach in most patent cases rather than the new standard
adopted by the Supreme Court in a recent patent case).
272 Beebe, supra note 198, at 602 (reporting that 7.4% of all federal fair use opinions continued to apply a
presumption that a Supreme Court case had explicitly struck down).
273 See, e.g., Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667,
711 (2009) (finding that 5.1% of federal district court qualified immunity cases decided in 2006 and 2007 overtly
violated a Supreme Court case addressing qualified immunity law); Tokson, supra note 26, at 957–58 (reporting
that courts favored the prior status quo following another major change in the standard governing qualified
immunity cases in 2009).
274 See, e.g., Zambrano, supra note 266, at 202 (reporting that roughly 7% of decisions overtly failed to comply
with a change in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert
Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 478 (2005) (reporting that many courts
continue to apply a simpler, prior status quo doctrine in indirect noncompliance with a major Supreme Court
case).
275 See Tokson, supra note 26, at 950 (discussing how status quo preference effects decrease over time).
276 The absolute number of these cases has diminished even more clearly, but because the total number of
Carpenter cases has decreased as well, possibly because of the COVID-19 pandemic, proportion is a more accurate
representation of the incidence of these cases. See supra Fig. 1 (displaying the number of cases finding outcomes
of search, no search, and good faith exception over time).
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Figure 2
Proportion of Determinative Cases Applying Strong, Pre-Carpenter Version of the Third-Party
Doctrine, Three-Quarter Rolling Average
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This proportion hovered around 15% to 16% initially, but has lately dropped to around
10% to 11%. It remains to be seen whether these cases continue to diminish as courts gain
familiarity with the Carpenter standard. In any event, the vast majority of cases show no
explicit or even implicit resistance towards Carpenter’s reformation of the third-party
doctrine. Nonetheless, some indirect noncompliance with Carpenter appears to be present in
lower court cases.
C.

Rethinking the Good Faith Exception

The good faith exception provides that evidence obtained in good faith reliance on a
statute, warrant, or other authority will not be excluded, even if the authority was incorrect
and the search for evidence was unconstitutional. 277 The idea is that police officers relying on
277

See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238–39 (2011).
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existing legal authority are acting in good faith and therefore cannot be effectively deterred by
the exclusion of evidence. 278 This doctrine has had a remarkably powerful impact on case
outcomes in post-Carpenter law.
Of the 399 decisions in the dataset that applied Carpenter substantively, 144 were resolved
based on the good faith exception without addressing the search issue, a rate of 36.1%. 279 The
vast majority of these good faith cases involved government officials obtaining historical cell
phone location data without a warrant, the practice declared unconstitutional in Carpenter. 280
Thus a surprisingly large percentage of post-Carpenter cases involve unconstitutional
government searches for which the persons affected have no meaningful remedy. 281
To be sure, the proportion of cases resolved via the good faith exception will decrease
over time, as fewer cases are tried involving pre-Carpenter searches of cell phone data. Figure
3 reports the proportion of good faith cases decided over time and shows this expected
decrease. But roughly 30% of cases were still being resolved on good faith grounds in 2020
and 2021, years after Carpenter was decided. 282 Ultimately, it is likely that hundreds of criminal
defendants will be convicted on the basis of searches that Carpenter deemed unconstitutional.

278 Id. at 249; Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 346 (1987); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995). The Court has
stated that the sole purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule is to deter Fourth Amendment
violations. Davis, 564 U.S. at 237–28; Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 & n.2 (2009). Many observers
have criticized this narrow, incentive-based concept of exclusion, noting that values of retributivism, judicial
integrity, due process, and others may also compel the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. E.g., Richard M.
Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885, 1891–92 (2014) (arguing that the Due Process
clauses compel exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence); David Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur: The Supreme
Court’s Contemporary Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013) (discussing
retributivism as an important foundation for the exclusionary rule); Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, “A
More Majestic Conception”: The Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
47, 71–78 (2010) (arguing that judicial integrity provides the strongest foundation for the exclusionary rule).
279 See infra notes 146, 148. An additional 11 cases applied the good faith exception after resolving the search
issue, for a total of 155 good faith exception cases, or 38.9% of the total.
280 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018).
281 Suspects tracked via their cell phone signals might attempt to sue on the basis of the constitutional violation,
but the damages for such lawsuits would be uncertain and they would likely be barred by qualified immunity,
which is likely even more difficult for litigants to overcome than the good faith exception. See, e.g., Joanna C.
Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 338–51 (2020) (describing the various doctrinal and
practical hurdles plaintiffs must overcome to defeat a defendant’s qualified immunity claim).
282 See Fig. 4.
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Figure 3
Proportion of Cases Applying Carpenter Resolved Based on the Good-Faith Exception, By Quarter
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The remarkably high proportion of cases resolved via the good faith exception following
a major Supreme Court decision should spur a reexamination of the good faith exception.
Current law may incentivize the police to aggressively apply new surveillance practices in order
to secure convictions, even when those practices are likely unconstitutional.
Consider the incentives the good faith exception gives law enforcement with respect to
new surveillance technologies. The police can often rely on old statutes as a basis to obtain
court orders for new forms of information. 283 This is exactly what happened prior to Carpenter,
See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848; 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a),
(b)(i)(B)(i) (authorizing the government to access emails stored for more than 180 days with an administrative or
grand jury subpoena); Id. at § 3122 (allowing the government to apply for a pen register or a trap and trace device
by submitting an application to a court of competent jurisdiction); Id. at § 3486 (sanctioning the use of
administrative subpoenas in investigations involving federal health care offenses); 19 U.S.C. § 1509 (authorizing
the U.S. Customs Service to issue a summons during “any investigation or inquiry”); 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (permitting
the IRS to issue a summons “to any person to produce for examination by the IRS any books, papers, records,
or other data” listed on the summons); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3016(D) (2021) (allowing law enforcement
to delay notice to a subscriber of a subpoena issued to a “communication service provider” for up to 90 days);
283
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2021 Q1

when the Stored Communications Act of 1986 (SCA) allowed police to obtain court orders
for cell phone location data with less than probable cause, because such data was a “record or
other information pertaining to a . . . customer” under the Act. 284 Officers relied on this general
purpose provision to obtain cell phone data in numerous cases, and the data was not excluded
from trial even after its collection was deemed unconstitutional in Carpenter. 285
Police reliance on the SCA is reflected in the dataset analyzed above. Although many of
the good faith cases in the dataset were decided on the basis of controlling circuit court
precedent, the majority of the cases were decided in jurisdictions without appeals court
opinions, solely on the basis of police reliance on the SCA. 286 The SCA, and the broader
Electronics Communications Privacy Act that encompasses it, are rife with provisions that
offer sub-Fourth-Amendment protections to wide varieties of data. 287 When officers use these
statutes to obtain new forms of digital information, the data will virtually always be admissible
at trial under the good faith exception, even if courts later declare it off limits without a
warrant. 288
This creates incentives that the Supreme Court has failed to recognize. When the police
encounter a new surveillance technology or practice that is arguably permitted by an old
statute, they have an incentive to aggressively use that surveillance to secure as many
convictions as possible before courts prohibit it. Law enforcement agencies can maximize
convictions and case clearance rates by a) pushing the envelope with intrusive surveillance
technologies and practices and b) accelerating the use of such surveillance as quickly as
possible, before courts impose warrant requirements. 289 By failing to exclude evidence in cases
involving reliance on broad statutes, courts have incentivized constitutional violations and
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(B)(2)(a) (West 2020) (directing a “health care provider” to supply patient drugtest results to law enforcement when the requesting officer indicates that the individual is the subject of an
“official criminal investigation . . . or proceeding”).
284 E.g., In re Application of United States for an Ord. Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose
Recs. to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)); In re Applications of United
States for Ords. Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code Section 2703(d), 509 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80 (D. Mass. 2007)
(“[H]istorical cell site information clearly satisfies each of the three definitional requirements of section 2703(c).”).
285 E.g., United States v. Herron, 762 F. App’x 25, 31 (2d Cir. 2019) (upholding a search of historical cell site
location data on good faith grounds because 18 U.S.C. § 2703 has not been declared unconstitutional at the time
of the search); United States v. Korte, 918 F.3d 750, 759 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding good faith reliance on the “thenlawful statute” of § 2703).
286 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703, a provision of the Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986, Pub, L. No. 99-508,
100 Stat. 1848.
287 See generally Tokson, supra note 2, at 592–94 (providing an overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act’s application to digital communications data). Even email content stored for more than 180 days can be
obtained with less than probable cause under the email provisions of the 1986 Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
288 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018) (holding that a warrant is required before obtaining
cell site location data); United States v. Herron, 762 F. App’x 25, 31 (2d Cir. 2019) (upholding a search of historical
cell site location data on good faith grounds because 18 U.S.C. § 2703 has not been declared unconstitutional at
the time of the search); United States v. Korte, 918 F.3d 750, 759 (9th Cir.) (finding good faith reliance on the
“then-lawful statute” of § 2703).
289 Police departments and officers generally have strong incentives to maximize clearance rates and arrests, while
prosecutors are highly motivated to obtain convictions. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Political Economy of
Entrapment, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 107, 132 (2005); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial
Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 134–36 (2004).
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undermined the privacy that the Fourth Amendment is meant to protect.
The Supreme Court could more effectively deter Fourth Amendment violations by
rethinking, and narrowing, the good faith exception. For example, Illinois v. Krull held that an
officer who relied on a statute specifically authorizing the inspection of automobile wrecking
yards was entitled to the good faith exception when he inspected a wrecking yard. 290 But Krull
has been quietly extended by lower courts to officers who rely on statutes that do not
specifically address the surveillance practice at issue. 291 The Supreme Court could make clear
that the good faith exception for statutes is limited to laws that address the particular practice
used. Alternatively, or in addition, the Court could limit the reach of Davis v. United States,
which extended the good faith exception to police reliance on controlling appeals court
precedent. 292 The Court might consider limiting the Davis rule to Supreme Court precedent
only, or to issues on which there is no split among the circuits. The current Davis rule risks
incentivizing police officers in jurisdictions with favorable circuit precedent to quickly and
aggressively apply new surveillance practices before the Supreme Court has a chance to weigh
in. 293
The extraordinary prevalence of the good faith exception in the years following a major,
pro-privacy Fourth Amendment case suggests that the Supreme Court has failed to strike the
proper balance of deterrence in its good faith jurisprudence. 294 By examining the incentives
that the good faith exception creates for police officers to aggressively employ new surveillance
technologies, the Court could eventually develop a more effective standard for deterring
constitutional violations.
D.

U.S. Constitutional Law in the State Courts

This Section examines two phenomena illustrated by the set of state court cases applying
Carpenter. The first involves state courts applying federal constitutional rights, and addresses
the familiar question of whether state courts can effectively do so. The second involves state

480 U.S. 340, 346 (1987).
See supra note 284.
292 564 U.S. 229, 238–39 (2011).
293 It is possible that these incentives contributed to the large numbers of good faith cases in the Northern District
of Georgia following the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) (en
banc). See supra Part II.B.3 and Tbl. 2. To be sure, curtailing the Davis rule might slightly disincentivize the
vigorous use of legitimate surveillance practices in certain situations. Officers may be less incentivized to use a
new surveillance practice if the evidence collected might be excluded should the Supreme Court ultimately find
the practice unconstitutional. But police are not made substantially worse off in most such situations—if the
practice is ultimately found constitutional, the evidence will be admitted, and if it is ultimately found
unconstitutional, the police can often still make their case with other evidence collected via constitutional means.
See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 172 A.D.3d 1110, 1111 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) (holding that other evidence of
defendant’s guilt was overwhelming, even in the absence of the cell phone location evidence).
294 See supra text accompanying notes 279–282; Re, supra note 278, at 1894–97 (discussing the difficulty of striking
the proper balance on deterrence in exclusionary rule cases); Kit Kinports, Culpability, Deterrence, and the
Exclusionary Rule, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 821, 836–37 (2013) (discussing inconsistencies in the logic of
deterrence in the Supreme Court’s good faith exception cases).
290
291
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courts expressly incorporating Carpenter into their state constitutional law, even as that law
continues to evolve independently of Fourth Amendment law going forward.
1.

State Courts Applying Federal Constitutional Rights

This Article’s analysis comprehensively surveyed both federal and state court cases
applying Carpenter v. United States. 295 As such, it offers a window into the phenomenon of state
courts applying the United States Constitution. Debates over the capacity of state judges to
effectively apply federal constitutional rights have persisted for decades. 296 Some
commentators have raised valid concerns that state judges, who typically lack salary and tenure
protections like those guaranteed to federal judges by Article III, may be more subject to
political pressure and therefore less likely to strike down state action as unconstitutional. 297
State judges may also be less experienced than their federal counterparts at applying federal
constitutional rights, as such issues necessarily make up a smaller portion of their docket. 298
Yet recent studies have suggested that state courts often protect individual constitutional rights
as vigorously as federal courts—or even more so in some areas. 299
In post-Carpenter law, state courts reaching determinative decisions found Fourth
Amendment searches at far higher rates (60.6%) than federal courts (21.9%). 300 While exact
comparisons are difficult between state and federal cases, state judges appear to be
substantially more amenable to claims of Fourth Amendment violations by government
officials. 301 As discussed above, this counterintuitive result cannot be explained by political
disparities between state and federal judges. 302 It is more likely that the disparity results from
state courts having less experience with the strong third-party doctrine that prevailed prior to
Carpenter. 303 State courts may apply new constitutional doctrines more vigorously than federal
courts because they are less attached to prior doctrines and more likely to approach novel legal
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
E.g., Solimine, supra note 32; Neuborne, supra note 155, at 1120–21; Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered:
Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 233, 233–34 (1988).
297 E.g., Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and
Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329, 333 (1988); Neuborne, supra note 155, at 1120–21.
298 Id.
299 Goodwin Liu, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights: A Reappraisal, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1307, 1330
& n.123 (2017); Solimine, supra note 32, at 1465–68. But cf. Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Judging Judicial
Elections, 114 MICH. L. REV. 929, 942, 945 (2016) (finding a significant relationship between electoral attack
advertising and judicial hostility to appeals by criminal defendants). To be sure, win rates alone only speak
indirectly to the competence of state judges to apply federal constitutional law, and there may be other differences
between federal and state cases that also contribute to win rates. See Chemerinsky, supra note 296, at 275–77. But
these results can at least suggest that state courts are not substantially more reluctant than federal courts to uphold
federal constitutional rights.
300 See supra Part II.A.2.a.
301 See Chemerinsky, supra note 296, at 275–80 (discussing the difficulties of precisely comparing state and federal
adjudication of federal constitutional rights).
302 State judges were more Republican-affiliated than federal judges yet still ruled in favor of criminal defendants
at higher rates, and in any event there was no statistically significant correlation between the partisan alignment
of judges and the case outcomes at the .05 level. See supra Part II.B.1.
303 See supra text accompanying note 298.
295
296
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questions with fresh eyes. 304 This comports with a previous study demonstrating that state
courts were more likely than federal courts to favorably resolve gay rights claims in the early
decades of LGBT+ rights litigation. 305 This “fresh eyes” effect may be another benefit of a
dual-track, federalized regime of constitutional adjudication. 306 State judges approach federal
constitutional cases from a unique institutional perspective, and the “creative ferment of
experimentation which federalism encourages” can be as beneficial in the realm of
constitutional interpretation as in any other legal area. 307
It is also notable that politically accountable state judges rule in favor of Fourth
Amendment rights at such high rates. They may perceive that a robust Fourth Amendment
search doctrine, which can limit government surveillance and monitoring, is politically popular
in ways that other pro-defendant constitutional rights are not. 308 Consistent with this theory,
elected and appointed judges found Fourth Amendment searches at similar rates in state
cases. 309
2.

Express Incorporation of a Supreme Court Ruling into State Law

A handful of cases in Massachusetts and Texas displayed another interesting
phenomenon in state court adjudication, that of state courts overtly incorporating a federal
Supreme Court decision into their state constitutional law. 310 For example, in Holder v. State,
the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas expressly incorporated the reasoning of Carpenter into
the law of Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution. 311 The court noted that it did so on a
case-by-case basis, with adoption dependent on its own assessment of “whether the Supreme
Court’s reasoning makes more sense than the alternatives.” 312 After a detailed analysis, the
court determined that it “share[d] the [Supreme] Court’s grave concerns about . . . continuous,
surreptitious, precise, and permeating” surveillance. 313 Accordingly, it “adopt[ed] the Supreme
See supra Part IV.B.
See DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW 105–17 (2003).
306 This dual-track system is supported by numerous Supreme Court decisions, federal statutes, and other sources
of law compelling respect for state adjudications of federal constitutional questions. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (limiting the ability of petitioners
to challenge state court decisions via habeas corpus); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 97 (1980) (holding that
collateral estoppel prohibits challenging state court Fourth Amendment decisions under Section 1983)
(discussing the benefits of federalism in the adjudication of federal constitutional law and the doctrinal choices
made by the Supreme Court that support this dual-track system).
307 Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 633 (1981).
308 See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 795 (2006). Cf. Kang &
Shepherd, supra note 299, at 942, 945 (examining elected state judges’ hostility towards criminal appeals); Paul R.
Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay of Preferences, Case Facts, Context, and Rules in the Politics of Judicial Choice,
59 J. POL. 1206, 1221–22 (1997) (examining state court adjudications of death penalty cases).
309 In state cases where the judicial selection method could be ascertained, 24 of 39 (61.5%) determinative
decisions by elected judges found a search, and 17 of 28 (60.7%) determinative decisions by appointed judges
found a search.
310 See generally Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-by-Case Adoptionism or
Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1506–09 (2005).
311 Holder v. State, 595 S.W.3d 691, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).
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304
305

47

Court’s reasoning in Carpenter” into Article I, Section 9, even as it made clear that it would
continue to interpret Texas law by its “own lights.” 314
In Commonwealth v. McCarthy, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court assessed an
automated license plate reader camera system under the Fourth Amendment and Article 14 of
the Massachusetts Constitution simultaneously, ultimately incorporating the reasoning of
Carpenter into Massachusetts law. 315 McCarthy discussed Carpenter factors including the revealing
nature, amount, and cost of surveillance in great detail, while deftly interweaving analyses of
Supreme Court cases with those of prior Massachusetts cases. 316 In cases following McCarthy,
Carpenter itself has been embedded into Article 14 jurisprudence, even as that law continues to
evolve on its own, independent of Fourth Amendment law. 317
These cases involve what Robert F. Williams has called “reflective adoption,” where a
state court addressing state constitutional law adopts the reasoning of a federal case on a oneoff basis. 318 This contrasts with other state constitutional approaches that mirror federal
constitutional law entirely, simply applying the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions in
every case involving a parallel state constitutional provision. 319 Likewise, it differs from state
constitutional approaches that largely ignore federal law. 320
Reflective adoption, with its case-by-case analysis of federal decisions, may reflect the
optimal approach for state courts in interpreting state constitutional provisions that parallel
federal constitutional provisions. 321 It allows state courts to benefit from the expertise of the
Supreme Court, while retaining the independence of state law. States can also experiment with
creative approaches to constitutional questions and different balances of law enforcement
interests and personal rights. 322 State innovations may ultimately feed back into Supreme Court
or federal statutory decisionmaking. 323
Reflective adoption also reinforces state sovereignty, at least in the domain of state
constitutional law. In these cases, a state high court essentially reviews the Supreme Court. It
Id. at 701, 697.
Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d 1090, 1095 (2020).
316 See, e.g., id. at 1099–1100 (discussing Carpenter and other Supreme Court cases and using them as a basis for
holding that when the “duration of digital surveillance drastically exceeds what would have been possible with
traditional law enforcement methods, that surveillance constitutes a search under art. 14”).
317 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mora, 150 N.E.3d 297, 312–13 (2020) (using McCarty and Carpenter to make a ruling
in an Article 14 case); Commonwealth v. Gosselin, 158 N.E.3d 8, 15 (2020) (addressing an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim based in part on Article 14 by reference to McCarty and Carpenter).
318 Williams, supra note 310, at 1506..
319 Id. at 1499 (quoting Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State
Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1166 (1985)).
320 See Barry Latzer, The New Judicial Federalism and Criminal Justice: Two Problems and a Response, 22 RUTGERS L.J.
863, 865 (1991).
321 E.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting or
penalizing the free exercise thereof.”); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12 (promising that the “accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself or herself”).
322 E.g., Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties,
and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 993–95 (2007) (discussing state law innovations in protecting data
disclosed to third-parties).
323 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 865–66 (2014) (finding cell phone location tracking
unconstitutional on state constitutional grounds in a pre-Carpenter case).
314
315

48

determines “whether the Supreme Court’s analysis . . . is persuasive” and either adopts it or
not according to its merits. 324 This is a unique inversion of the more typical review process,
where the Supreme Court reviews state high court decisions applying federal law. 325 Reflective
adoption cases warrant further study by federalism and constitutional law scholars, and state
cases applying Carpenter offer some of the clearest examples of the phenomenon to date. 326
E.

Alternative Directions and Paradigms

This section supplements the largely descriptive analysis of this Article by offering some
prescriptive suggestions for courts and legislators. Many of these suggestions stem directly
from the analysis above.
For a start, whichever test courts eventually adopt, they should unambiguously select a
set of factors and then consider each of those factors in every case they decide under Carpenter.
Currently, judges typically analyze the one to three factors that weighed most heavily in their
decision and ignore the ones they found less important. 327 It is time for courts to abandon this
practice. Courts could greatly enhance clarity and predictability for litigants by considering the
same set of factors in every case. Even if the test used varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
litigants would at least know which factors to address in their arguments. Enough time has
passed that the courts of appeal, and eventually the Supreme Court, can draw on numerous
lower court decisions in deciding which factors to adopt.
In addition, lower courts’ virtual refusal to consider the number of people affected by
surveillance suggests that number should not be a factor in Carpenter analyses going forward. 328
Concerns about widespread surveillance programs are certainly valid, because such programs
make it more likely that the government will collect and process information about people for
reasons unconnected to legitimate law enforcement purposes. 329 But determining the number
of persons potentially affected by a surveillance practice may be too administratively or
conceptually difficult for courts. 330 Courts may find it difficult to ascertain the scope of a
surveillance practice and may be reluctant to credit defendants with the potential privacy harms
of non-litigants. 331 Finally, in general, reducing the quantity of factors in the Carpenter test
would likely enhance its clarity and administrability. The number factor appears to be the
easiest cut to make.
As to the other factors, I have argued elsewhere that the inescapable nature of surveillance
and the automatic nature of data collection should ideally not be used to determine the scope
Holder v. State, 595 S.W.3d 691, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).
E.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1044 (1983) (holding that Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear case
because the state high court’s decision appeared to rest primarily on federal law).
326 See Williams, supra note 310, at 1508 (offering developing the concept of reflective adoption but offering few
real-world examples). See also Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 211–12 (Ohio 1999) (adopting the federal
Lemon test but reserving the right to diverge from federal law in future cases).
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of the Fourth Amendment. 332 These factors speak to the voluntary nature of data disclosure
to third parties, a concept grounded in widely criticized pre-Carpenter caselaw. 333 To be sure,
examining the voluntary nature of disclosure can help courts ascertain how much individuals
value the secrecy of their data, or how likely their data is to be exposed to the public. 334 But
basing the Fourth Amendment on whether consumers voluntarily disclosed their data may
sharply limit constitutional protections for personal information. 335 The disclosure of data to
services like Uber, Google Maps, dating apps, smart home devices, websites, and countless
other providers is in theory voluntary and avoidable, but in practice is a beneficial and
important part of Americans’ lives. 336 Punishing users for disclosing their data to service
providers creates perverse incentives and is incompatible with effective Fourth Amendment
protection in the digital age. 337 Voluntariness-based tests would also frequently expose the
most sensitive forms of personal information to government surveillance. 338 Optional
technologies such as dating apps, smart home devices, and DNA analysis services often
capture especially intimate personal information. 339 Moreover, voluntariness approaches can
create substantial inequalities in Fourth Amendment law. 340 Technologies that are avoidable
for most people are often unavoidable for others, including the disabled, the poor, and other
disadvantaged populations. 341 For all of these reasons, courts should be cautious in definitively
adopting inescapable or automatic disclosure of data as factors in a mandatory Carpenter test.
On the other hand, the cost of surveillance is a potentially useful factor that more courts
should consider adopting. Conceptually, cost dovetails nicely with amount. 342 When the
government is able to capture large amounts of data at a low cost, the potential for large-scale
surveillance raises serious concerns about individual liberty and government power. 343 By
assessing the general cost of a surveillance practice, courts may be able to address the concerns
about large-scale surveillance programs embodied in the number factor, without the
conceptual or doctrinal awkwardness of assessing the number of non-litigants affected. 344
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Those courts that do assess cost in the dataset seem to have found it administrable and
typically decide cases in the direction that it indicates. 345
Finally, legislatures and regulators have a role to play in addressing future government
surveillance practices. For example, government purchases of sensitive data from commercial
entities might be regulated by the Fourth Amendment, but the issue is complex and protection
is far from certain. 346 Statutory limits on such purchases can provide more thorough and
certain safeguards. 347 Likewise, beneficial technologies such as smart utility meters may require
permissive Fourth Amendment standards regarding data collection coupled with strong
restrictions on unauthorized uses of the data. 348 Statutes will often be the optimal means to
impose use restrictions, as they can offer more detailed guidance and cover non-governmental
or quasi-governmental entities. 349 In general, widespread and programmatic surveillance is
particularly well-suited to statutory regulation. 350
In each of these areas, however, Fourth Amendment law remains likely to play a
substantial role in regulating government surveillance. The slow pace of federal privacy
legislation and the weak or absent nature of most state privacy statutes means that courts will
continue to address complex new Fourth Amendment questions—or else fail to restrain
government surveillance at all. 351 Yet the choice between regulation by courts or by legislative
and executive bodies is not a binary one. Courts’ Fourth Amendment decisions can set a floor
for privacy protection, and legislatures (or agencies) can then create additional protections
against certain forms of surveillance. For example, shortly after the Supreme Court extended
Fourth Amendment protection to telephone conversations, 352 Congress passed the Wiretap
Act, which added additional restrictions on wiretapping. 353 Or legislatures could move first,
passing laws regulating surveillance that courts could then evaluate for compliance with the
Fourth Amendment. 354 Either way, legislative and administrative regulation of surveillance
would bring to bear the managerial advantages of the political branches, and would certainly
be a welcome addition. 355
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CONCLUSION
The future of Fourth Amendment law remains uncertain, especially given recent changes
at the Supreme Court and the continued development of new surveillance technologies. But
it is possible to better understand the present state of the law and the paths along which it will
likely continue to develop. This Article’s detailed empirical analysis has resolved some of the
mysteries posed by the landmark Carpenter case and shed light on many others. For example,
the factors that drive lower court decisions clearly include the revealing nature of the data at
issue, the amount of data collected, and the automatic nature of data disclosure, and clearly do
not include the number of persons affected. Carpenter has been broadly adopted by lower
courts with very little overt resistance, although some traces of indirect noncompliance remain.
Courts find Fourth Amendment searches in relatively few rulings, and federal courts find
searches at substantially lower rates than state courts. Further, the good faith exception
accounts for a remarkably high proportion of all resolved cases citing Carpenter, and hundreds
of defendants will likely be convicted on the basis of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in
these cases.
More broadly, the Article represents a years-long, comprehensive survey of the impact of
a transformative Supreme Court opinion in the years following its publication. Across many
hundreds of cases, the study has examined the variety of lower court reactions to a dramatic
change in doctrine. It has also offered several proposals for courts and lawmakers to improve
the regulation of new surveillance practices. But just as importantly, it opens the door to a
variety of new proposals about the future course of Fourth Amendment law, grounded in a
deeper knowledge of courts’ current practices. Understanding how Fourth Amendment law is
being applied in the present provides an essential foundation for future progress.
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APPENDIX
Appendix Table A reports the outcomes of all state cases substantively applying Carpenter,
and the number and win rate of cases that reach a determinative ruling on whether a
government action was a Fourth Amendment search. 356 Overall, state cases demonstrated a
far higher win rate than federal cases. 357 In addition, a substantially smaller proportion of state
cases (21.7%) than federal cases (41.8%) were resolved based on the good faith exception. 358
This latter disparity is likely the result of there being more pending cases in the federal system
involving the collection of cell phone location data at the time Carpenter was decided. 359
Appendix Table A
State Court Decisions and Defendant Win Rates, by State
State

360

Alabama
Arizona
California
Colorado
Conn.
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Mass.
Michigan
Minnesota
Nebraska

Total
Substantive
Decisions
1
8
6
1
2
2
7
5
10
2
1
1
1
1
11
5
2
2

Determinative
Rulings

Win Rates
(Win = Search)

Good Faith
Exception Rulings 361

0
3
4
1
1
1
6
1
3
1
1
1
0
0
11
2
2
0

–
.333
.250
1.000
1.000
1.000
.500
.000
.667
.000
1.000
.000
–
–
.545
.500
.500
–

1
4
1
0
0
0
1
3
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
3
0
2

See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra note 149.
358 See supra note 146 and accompanying text (discussing federal case outcomes) and note 148 and accompanying
text (discussing state case outcomes).
359 For additional discussion of the issues raised by the large number of good faith exception cases in the dataset,
see supra Part IV.C.
360 States without relevant decisions are omitted from the table.
361 These refer to rulings where no substantive ruling was reached and the case was resolved on good faith
exception grounds. There were twenty-three total rulings that were neither substantive nor good faith exception
rulings, which were resolved on other procedural grounds. See supra note 148.
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Nevada
New Mexico
New York
N.C.
Ohio
Oklahoma
Penn.
Puerto Rico
S.C.
Tenn.
Texas
Virginia
Wash.

2
1
9
1
8
1
10
1
2
3
12
2
2

1
1
6
0
4
0
8
1
1
0
9
0
2

1.000
.000
.500
–
.750
–
.750
1.000
1.000
–
.556
–
1.000

0
0
0
1
3
1
0
0
1
0
0
2
0

Total

122

71

.606
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